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TECHNOLOGY CONVERGENCE AND FEDERALISM:
WHO SHOULD DECIDE THE FUTURE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION?
Daniel A. Lyons*
This Article critically examines the division of regulatory jurisdiction over tele-
communications issues between the federal government and the states. Currently,
the line between federal and state jurisdiction varies depending on the service at
issue. This compartmentalization might have made sense fifteen years ago, but the
advent of technology convergence has largely rendered this model obsolete. Yester-
day's telephone and cable companies now compete head-to-head to offer consumers
the vaunted "triple play" of voice, video, and internet services. But these telecom-
munications companies are finding it increasingly difficult to fit new operations
into arcane, rigid regulatory compartments. Moreover, services that consumers
view as near-perfect substitutes-such as cable and satellite television-face differ-
ent regulatory treatment largely due to historical accident. This Article proposes
that Congress instead allocate jurisdiction in a platform-neutral manner based
upon the relative strengths of federal and state regulators. The federal government
is best positioned to regulate economic issues that, if left to the states, would gener-
ate substantial spillover effects and disrupt economies of scale. By comparison,
state regulators are best qualified to make decisions that turn upon local knowl-
edge. The Article recommends a hybrid model for consumer protection, whereby
states bring local issues to the FCC's attention, and the FCC adjudicates these is-
sues from an appropriately national scope.
When it was enacted in 1996, the Telecommunications Act was
widely considered a landmark achievement. President Clinton
hailed the Act as "truly revolutionary legislation" and boldly de-
clared that "with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with
our future."' In the span of nearly one hundred pages, the Act
sought a complete overhaul of one-sixth of the economy,' aiming
"to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommu-
nications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard
Law School, 2005. Tremendous gratitude to Marvin Ammori, Thomas Hazlett, Crystal Lyons,
Robert Metzger, Andrew Song, Henry Weissmann, and participants in workshops at Boston
College Law School, George Mason School of Law, the University of Nebraska College of
Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, and Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law for
their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors, of course, are attributable to me alone.
1. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
in 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 215-16 (Feb. 8,1996).
2. SeeJoseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1326 (1998).
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telecommunications technologies."3 It was, one influential com-
mentator proclaimed, "likely [to] be remembered as the most
important piece of economic legislation of the twentieth century.
4
Yet in hindsight, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the
Telecommunications Act is how small these policymakers had
dared to dream. While the Act purported to promote technologi-
cal development and competition,' Congress largely left intact the
preexisting framework of jurisdictional separation between the
federal government and the states. This compartmentalized, or
"silo," model draws different lines between federal and state au-
thority depending on the type of service at issue. For example, the
Act grants the federal government primary jurisdiction over inter-
state telephone service, wireless communications, and internet
service. But the states remain the primary nexus of regulation over
local landline telephone and cable television service-just as they
have throughout most of the industry's history.
Retention of this legacy model may have made sense in 1996,
when landline telephone companies and cable television providers
dominated the industry landscape, wireless technology was in its
infancy, and most of the 12 million Americans who had internet
service accessed the "Information Superhighway" via dial-up mo-
dems. But the myriad technological innovations since 1996 have
rendered this segmented worldview largely obsolete. First came
diffusion, the ability to deliver voice and video communications on
platforms other than traditional landline telephone and cable
lines. Today, Americans talk more minutes on cellular phones than
landlines each month, while voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP)
service and satellite television continue to make inroads into the
voice and video market, respectively. The second, and arguably
more significant, innovation is convergence, the ability to offer mul-
tiple telecommunications services on a single network platform.
Yesterday's monoline telephone and cable companies have grown
into sophisticated full-service telecommunications providers, each
offering customers the "triple play" of voice, video, and internet-
based services on a single platform.
Each step the industry takes toward convergence demonstrates
further the brittle obsolescence of the silo-based regulatory model.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996)
(preamble).
4. PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.9, at 53 (2d ed.
1999).
5. See, e.g., § 302(b), 110 Stat. at 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), which had pre-
vented local exchange carriers from offering video services in markets where they held a
monopoly on telephone services).
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The retention of this artificial regulatory divide distorts competi-
tion by requiring different companies to overcome different
regulatory obstacles to offer the same bundle of services to con-
sumers. Sometimes this distortion is unintentional: for example,
companies that are unsure how to classify a new service must spend
time and money seeking clarification from various federal and
state authorities, which do not always reach a uniform conclusion.
Other distortions are intentional, such as when incumbent mo-
nopolies use local government allies to insulate themselves from
competition. Either way, this artificial jurisdictional divide in-
creases the costs of providing telecommunications service,
arbitrarily favors some networks over others, and prevents custom-
ers from fully realizing the competitive benefits that convergence
could bring.
This Article recommends that Congress allow convergence to
blur the regulatory lines that the Telecommunications Act has
struggled in vain to keep distinct. Rather than isolating telecom-
munications services into individual silos with varying levels of state
regulatory control, Congress should recognize a unitary federal
interest in maintaining a nationwide telecommunications network
that delivers multiple services over a variety of competing plat-
forms. Both consumers and telecommunications companies
benefit from a regulatory framework that encourages companies to
offer as many services as possible to as many potential customers as
possible. By viewing this network in a service- and platform-neutral
fashion, Congress can determine which aspects of telecommunica-
tions service are best regulated at the national level, and which are
best regulated at the local level, without fear of distorting competi-
tion through regulatory disparity.
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I places the silo model in
historical context, showing how telephone and cable companies
developed as largely local services that were gradually subjected to
regulation partly due to concerns that each could constitute a
natural monopoly. Part II discusses the myriad problems that face
today's telecommunications providers as they struggle to fit new
products and business models into the obsolete silo-based regula-
tory structure. The artificial contours of the silo-based model
create uncertainty and regulatory disparity that discourage invest-
ment in new technologies and infrastructure improvement. State
regulators often fail to appreciate the costs their rules impose be-
yond their borders, and new entrants struggle to overcome local
barriers to entry.
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Part III outlines an alternative approach to telecommunications
regulation that allocates jurisdiction in a content- and platform-
neutral manner based upon the relative strengths of federal and
state regulators. The federal government is in the best position to
regulate issues that, if left to the states, would create substantial
spillover effects that could unreasonably disrupt national econo-
mies of scale. By comparison, state regulators are best qualified to
make decisions that turn upon local knowledge. Federal preemp-
tion of economic regulation such as rates and market entry places
these decisions in the hands of regulators with a national perspec-
tive, able to assess all of the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.
But states should retain regulatory authority over local issues such
as public rights-of-way access, decisions that the FCC lacks both the
ability and the inclination to adjudicate properly. In the more dif-
ficult arena of consumer protection, this Article recommends a
hybrid model whereby states rely on local knowledge to prosecute
cases before the FCC, while the FCC adjudicates these issues from
an appropriately national scope.
I. LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION:
A SHORT PRIMER
Before analyzing what the proper divide ought to be between fed-
eral and state authority, it is helpful to examine the forces that gave
rise to the existing model. Both telephone and cable television ser-
vice began as primarily local services, providing improved
communications capabilities within small communities and focusing
very little on services that crossed state boundaries. State-by-state
regulation of these services flowed naturally from this local orienta-
tion and from the reality that most regulatory issues related to the
6deployment of the physical infrastructure into local communities.
By conscious design, federal regulation primarily governed activi-
ties that were beyond the capabilities of states to regulate, and did
so in a manner that expressly reinforced state supremacy over in-
trastate services.
6. See Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The
Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELE-
CoMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 316 (2008).
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A. Local Telephone Service
The first telephones were simple point-to-point systems that
linked two individual calling stations.7 In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, telephone companies developed local exchanges, which
allowed all telephones connected to a local switchboard to com-
municate with one another.8  Gradually, thousands of local
exchange carriers developed across the country, each coordinating
the telephone traffic for its local community. But calls outside
one's city were difficult, initially because signal quality deteriorated
rapidly over longer distances,9 and later because the local ex-
changes refused to interconnect with one another."
Gradually, state lawmakers became concerned that local ex-
change service was a natural monopoly that could have deleterious
effects on consumers. A substantial fixed capital investment was
necessary to provide telephone lines throughout a community and
to build an exchange to process calls; the installation of a second
network to compete against an incumbent provider was seen as
both expensive and wastefully duplicative." But while the econom-
ics suggested that a local market might be most efficiently served
by a single provider, natural monopolies carry the risk that the
monopolist would abuse its position by charging inefficiently high
rates, neglecting customer service, or leveraging its advantage to
unfairly compete in other markets.
These concerns magnified as the Bell Telephone Company be-
gan aggressively combating local competition in those markets
where a rival network had developed. Bell, the nation's first tele-
phone provider, owned regional affiliate companies which
controlled local exchanges throughout the country, and also
owned key patents, most notably on the technology that facilitated
high-quality long-distance communication between local ex-
changes. 2 Under the slogan "One Policy, One System, Universal
7. HUBER, supra note 4, § 1.2.2.
8. Id.
9. Specifically, in the late 1890s, George Campbell, an engineer for Bell Telephone
Company, discovered that by concentrating inductance in coils along telephone lines, a
procedure known as "loading the lines," one could improve transmission quality. Id. § 1.2.3.
Shortly thereafter, Lee DeForest developed a vacuum tube electronic amplifier, the
"audion," which amplified electric signals and could be placed at intervals along a telephone
line to act as "repeaters" for a long distance call. Id. Together, Campbell's procedure and
DeForest's audion (the patent for which Bell purchased in 1913) allowed Bell Telephone to
deploy interexchange transmission lines that could carry long-distance calls between com-
munities and ultimately across the country. Id.
10. Id. §§ 1.2.3, 3.2.1.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 3.2.1.
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Service," Bell leveraged its long-distance advantage by refusing to
interconnect with non-Bell-affiliated local exchanges, which caused
many independent telephone companies to fold." As Bell increas-
ingly became communities' sole telephone company, state
regulators stepped in to regulate local telephone service, typically
by granting the telephone company a franchise to offer monopoly
local telephone service at reasonable rates and with universal ac-
14
cess.
Ultimately, Bell's dominance of long-distance service proved an
obstacle insurmountable even to state regulatory commissions. 5 As
a result, state lawmakers joined the few remaining independent
telephone companies to call for federal regulation of the Bell mo-
nopoly. 6 In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, which
sought to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States ... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable charges." 7 Among other provisions, the 1934 Act de-
termined that interstate telephone service should be subject to
common carrier regulation as administered by a new Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC").18 This classification meant
that Bell had to offer its long-distance service at just and reason-
able rates pursuant to interstate tariffs filed with the Commission,
and could not unreasonably discriminate between customers in the
provision of services. 9
But states sought assurance that regulation of long-distance
telephone services would not become a federal camel's nose under
13. Id. §§ 1.3, 3.2.1. Bell's aggressive tactics may lead one to wonder whether tele-
phone service was in fact a "natural" monopoly at the time. But natural or not, Bell was
unquestionably a monopolist entity by the early 1900s.
14. Id. § 3.2.5.
15. Id. § 3.2.5 n.34.
16. Technically, the Mann-Elkins Act granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
federal regulatory authority over telephone networks as early as 1910. Id. § 3.2.2. And at least
initially, the Justice Department sought to monitor Bell's monopolistic behavior, even bring-
ing an antitrust action against the company in 1913. Id. § 4.4.1. The following year, Bell and
the Justice Department signed the Kingsbury Commitment, which required Bell to inter-
connect with independents and to refrain from further acquisitions. Id. § 4.4.1. But the ICC
soon became preoccupied with managing the abuses committed by the nation's railroad
system, the antitrust case was dropped, and the Kingsbury Commitment was at least partially
abrogated by statute. See id. §§ 1.3.3, 3.2.2. As a result, the Bell monopoly was effectively
permitted to grow unchecked by federal authority until the arrival of the Communications
Act. See id.
17. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996)).
18. See id. (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)).
19. See id. (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2006)) (prohibiting unjust
and unreasonable rates and prohibiting unreasonable discrimination between customers).
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the states' regulatory tent.2° When the 1934 Communications Act
was adopted, intrastate calls comprised ninety-eight percent of
telephone traffic, and 45 of the 48 states had created regulatory
commissions to oversee local exchange services.2' States feared that
a power-hungry FCC would eventually displace their control over
this local telephone market. Their concerns were not unfounded:
the Supreme Court had just recently upheld the Interstate Com-
merce Commission's authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates,
because intrastate railroad activity had an incidental effect upon its
22regulation of interstate rates. To prevent the FCC from assuming
similar jurisdiction, Congress included within the Communications
Act a clear provision that "nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect
to ... intrastate communication service., 23 As the Supreme Court
has explained, the Act sought "to divide the world of domestic
telephone service neatly into two hemispheres-one comprised of
interstate service, over which the FCC would have plenary author-
ity, and the other made up of intrastate services, over which the
states would retain exclusive jurisdiction. 2 4
Under this regulatory scheme, the vertically-integrated Bell Sys-
tem, doing business as AT&T and several regional Bell affiliates,
dominated the telecommunications industry for nearly fifty years.
But by the late 1960s and early 1970s, economists and policymakers
began to realize that some aspects of telecommunications service
might not exhibit the behavior of a natural monopoly. It soon be-
came clear that AT&T was exploiting its monopoly over local
exchange service to prevent new entrants from challenging its con-
trol of related markets for telephone equipment,25 computer-based
"enhanced" telecommunications services,26 and even long-distance
service. Eventually the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
20. See GEOFFREY NUNBERG, GOING NUCULAR: LANGUAGE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN
CONFRONTATIONAL TIMES 118 (2004) (explaining origins of fable wherein an Arab miller
allows a camel to stick its nose into his tent, then other parts of its body, until the camel is
entirely inside and refuses to leave).
21. HUBER, supra note 4, § 3.2.5.
22. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342,
351 (1914).
23. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 (1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1996)).
24. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
25. See Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Use of
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Commc'ns Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970).
27. In 1970, MCI received FCC approval, over AT&T's fierce opposition, to provide pri-
vate point-to-point communication service between Chicago and St. Louis using microwave
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sued AT&T, prompting eight years of litigation that ended with the
voluntary breakup of the Bell System. 2 Under a 1984 consent de-
cree, 2 9 AT&T spun off its local telephone operations into seven
regional holding companies known as Regional Bell Operating
Companies or "Baby Bells," which in turn owned the Bell System's
twenty-two local telephone companies.
The consent decree placed certain restrictions on the Baby Bells
but left their core local telephone operations within the states'
purview. Under the court's modified final judgment ("MFJ"), the
country was divided into 163 Local Access and Transport Areas, or
"LATAs," whose boundaries largely corresponded to metropolitan
statistical areas."' The consent decree largely assumed that the Baby
Bells would have monopolies over local exchange service within
each LATA. To prevent the Baby Bells from abusing that power, the
MFJ prevented them from providing interLATA (or "long-distance")
telephone service and also forbade their entry into markets for vari-
ous non-telephone services. 2 Within these broad restrictions,
however, the Baby Bells continued to offer local exchange service
pursuant to state tariffs and the terms of their state franchise
agreements. 33 Thus throughout the telephone's regulatory history,
the notion that local telephone service was a natural monopoly dis-
tinct from long-distance service justified state-by-state regulation of
the industry under such terms and conditions as state regulators
saw fit to impose.
B. Local Franchising of Cable Television Service
Like telephony, cable television was originally developed as a
largely local service. In the late 1940s, community antenna televi-
transmission technology. Microwave Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), reh'g denied, 21
F.C.C.2d 190 (1970). Shortly thereafter, MCI and others built out nationwide networks with
the FCC's approval with the goal of competing directly against AT&T for long-distance busi-
ness. When AT&T refused to permit these rivals to interconnect with its local exchange
facilities, MCI brought, and won, a suit alleging violations of the Sherman Act. MCI
Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
28. For an excellent discussion of the consent decree and its effect on post-breakup
telecommunications regulation, see Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
1395 (1999).
29. Id. at 1418. The decree did not take effect until January 1, 1984. Id. at 1418-19.
30. These regional companies were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pa-
cific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and U.S. West. See id. at 1419.
31. HUBER, supra note 4, § 9.6.1.2. Notably, because LATAs followed natural popula-
tion boundaries, some LATAs crossed state boundaries. Id.
32. SeeKearney, supra note 28, at 1415-17.
33. See ido at 1419.
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sion ("CATV") service was introduced to improve signal reception
for broadcast television stations. 4 In certain valleys and outlying ar-
eas, residents found it difficult to receive quality over-the-air
television broadcasts using a set-top or rooftop antenna. To remedy
this problem, a CATV provider could place a large antenna on a
nearby mountaintop, which could pick up local broadcast signals
and retransmit them through cables that ran from the antenna to
these signal-challenged residents. 5 These initial cable systems
generally did not offer programs beyond those already broadcast
over-the-air, because technology limited the number of channels
available and the customer base was too small to support develop-
ment and distribution of original content.
6
By the 1960s, local governments began franchising these cable
systems. Their authority stemmed from municipal control of public
rights-of-way, access to which cable companies needed to deploy
their networks As a condition of granting that access, municipali-
ties imposed franchise conditions "in the public interest"' ranging
from simple permit costs to more substantial franchise fees, con-
struction of public, educational, and governmental ("PEG") access
channels, and even requirements wholly unrelated to cable televi-
sion operation. 9 Many cities and states also began regulating rates
out of fear that cable, like local telephone service, was a natural
monopoly requiring consumer protection. °
The FCC also asserted jurisdiction over cable services in fits and
spurts, which generated substantial confusion regarding the scope
of federal and state jurisdiction. The Commission was initially con-
tent to abstain from regulating cable, believing that it lacked the
authority to do so under the Communications Act.4 ' But as cable
34. See Robert W. Crandall et al., Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a
Cable Franchise , 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 259 (2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Thomas Hildebrandt, Note, Unplugging the Cable Franchise: A Regulatory Frame-
work To Promote the IPTV Cable Alternative, 42 GA. L. REV. 227, 234 (2007).
38. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
39. See Hildebrandt, supra note 37, at 234.
40. See Crandall, supra note 34, at 260; Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TVFranchises As Barri-
ers To Competition, 12 VA.J.L. & TECH. 2, 10 (2007) [hereinafter Hazlett, Cable TVFranchises].
41. See Frontier Broad. Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 255-56 (1958). In Frontier, broad-
cast stations filed an FCC complaint seeking Commission regulation of cable systems as
common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act. The FCC dismissed the action,
stating that it did "not believe that... [cable] systems are engaged in performing the service
of communications common carriers within the contemplation of the applicable provisions
of the Communications Act." Id. at 253-54. It confirmed this ruling the following year in
Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite Stations" & TV "Repeater"
Servs. on the Orderly Dev. of Television Broad., 26 F.C.C. 403, 428-29 (1959), noting that Con-
gressional action would be required before the Commission could assert general jurisdiction
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service proliferated, the Commission stepped in to protect the in-
terests of over-the-air broadcasters that it did directly regulate.42 In
the 1960s and 1970s, the Commission experimented with regula-
tions requiring cable operators to carry all local channels in a
market, preventing them from retransmitting distant signals from
other markets, 4 3 and developing, then scuttling, a labyrinthine
scheme to regulate original content. 4 By the 1970s, the Commis-
sion also sought to regulate both the fees that cable operators
could charge and those that municipalities could charge for cable
franchises. This overlapping jurisdiction left cable in an
"ill [-] defined.., state of regulatory uncertainty"4 6 that stifled com-
petition and prevented innovation.
The 1984 Cable Act resolved this uncertainty by providing Con-
gressional imprimatur of local franchising.47 The Cable Act
prohibited companies from providing multichannel video services
through cable lines without a franchise from state or local govern-
ment. The terms of these franchise agreements were largely left in
the hands of the local franchising authority, but the Act adopted
some broad restrictions such as a cap on franchise fees and rules
that largely eliminated rate regulation of cable companies. In re
sponse to concerns that the 1984 Act had spawned a precipitous
rise in cable rates, Congress amended the Act in 1992 to prohibit
over cable. See also Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008) (trac-
ing history of cable regulation).
42. The Supreme Court found that the FCC had limited jurisdiction over cable ser-
vices pursuant to its Title I authority, because such regulation was "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
43. See Rules and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broad. Signals
by Cmty. Antenna Television Syss., 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (second report & order). Notably,
the Commission approached the jurisdictional question with some concern and explained
that it sought no general regulatory authority over cable. "Rather, we view our role as one of
cooperating with local franchising authorities and State regulatory commissions to the
maximum extent possible, such as by making information available to them, consulting with
respect to technical standards for CATV operations, etc." Rules and Regulations Relating to
the Distribution of Television Broad. Signals by Cmty. Antenna Television Syss., 1 F.C.C.2d
453, 466 (1965) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
44. See Crandall, supra note 34, at 259. For example, these regulations limited pre-
mium programming "to one feature film more than two years old and less than ten years old
per week for one week of each month" and precluded broadcast of most live sporting events.
Id. The stated purpose of such regulations was to prevent pay television from "siphoning"
away popular programming that otherwise would be available to the public for free. Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
45. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
46. See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
American Civil Liberties Union, 823 F.2d at 1559).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.).
48. See id.
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exclusive franchise agreements and to reinstitute local authority to
engage in rate regulation." Thus by the mid-1990s, Congress had
explicitly decentralized effective regulation of cable services to
state and local governments, which acted within the Cable Act's
broad scope of authority.
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996"o sought to revolutionize
the industry by adapting legacy regulations to meet twenty-first-
century challenges. The centerpiece of the Act was the creation of
a competitive market for local telephone service. To accomplish
this goal, the Act preempted state-granted monopolies over local
telephone service and required the Baby Bell local exchange carri-
ers to offer their networks for use by a new category of phone
companies known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
("CLECs").-51 Under this scheme, a CLEC could enter the local
telephone market in one of three ways: it could purchase local
telephone services from a Baby Bell at wholesale rates for resale to
end users, lease elements of the Baby Bell's network on an unbun-
dled basis, or interconnect its own facilities with the Baby Bell's
network . Congress hoped that through this complex regulatory
scheme, a new generation of telephone companies would emerge
to challenge the Baby Bells and stimulate competition in the provi-
sion of local exchange service.
But the Act consciously preserved the Communications Act's ju-
risdictional divide between interstate and intrastate telephone
service. Local competition was a federally-mandated scheme but
was to be executed primarily by the states against a backdrop of
broad FCC guidelines. State public utilities commissions were to
review interconnection agreements between the Baby Bells and
new market entrants and to arbitrate disputes when the parties
failed to reach an agreement.53 State regulators also explicitly re-
tained authority to regulate local telephone companies to promote
universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the
continued quality of communications service, safeguard the rights
49. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
50. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
51. § 101, 110 Stat. at 62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253(a) (2006)).
52. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
53. § 101, 110 Stat. at 66-70 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2006)).
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of consumers, and manage local rights-of-way.54 Through this mix-
ture of "dual federalism" and "cooperative federalism," it was
thought that Congress could achieve its broad policy objectives
while still respecting the states' interest in local telephone regula-
tion that had justified Section 2 of the 1934 Act.
Similarly, the Act added a layer of broad federal policy objectives
to cable regulation while preserving traditional local control over
the service. Most notably, the Act lifted preexisting restrictions on
telephone company entry into the cable market.55 It also re-
imposed restrictions that effectively prevented rate regulation of
56cable companies. But the Act largely left intact the preexisting
system of local regulation of cable through franchise agreements,
subject to an amorphous requirement that local franchise authori-
ties not "unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive
franchise" to compete against an incumbent provider. 7
Thus the Telecommunications Act of 1996 generally retained
the states' preexisting authority to regulate local telephone and
cable service, subject to certain broad federal guidelines. This
preservation of local control stands in stark contrast to other tele-
communications services, such as wireless communications, which
the Act placed primarily in the Commission's hands..5 8 The silo-
based model of telecommunications federalism stemmed in part
from historical accident: because telephone and cable service be-
gan as local services and were largely considered local monopolies,
54. § 101, 110 Stat. at 70-71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(b)-(c)).
55. See § 302(b), 110 Stat. at 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), which had prevented
local exchange carriers from offering video services in markets where they held a monopoly
on telephone services).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (2006).
57. Id. § 541 (a)(1). The Telecommunications Act did provide three alternatives for
telephone companies to enter the video market without going through the traditional local
franchising process. The phone company could choose to offer its video service as a com-
mon carrier service under Title II of the Communications Act, which would subject it to the
same requirements as its telephone business with respect to charging just and reasonable
rates and preventing unreasonable discrimination in rates or services between customers.
Alternatively, it could offer video over wireless channels as a radio-based system, or over
cable as an open video system, if it chose to dedicate two-thirds of its channel capacity to
public use. Id. § 571. Common carriage and radio-based services proved to be uneconomical
to operate. While open video services seemed a viable alternative to traditional cable for a
period, the Fifth Circuit soon found that the Act did not preclude local franchise authorities
from placing restrictions on open video services as a condition of accessing public rights-of-
way that are identical to those placed upon cable franchise operators. City of Dallas v. FCC,
165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999). This holding effectively subjected open video services to all the
local regulatory burdens placed upon traditional cable franchises, plus the additional capac-
ity set-asides required under the Telecommunications Act. As a result, "OVS turned out to
be a flop" and has not been adopted by providers. Michael Botein, Open Video Systems: Too
Much Regulation Too Late?, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 439, 439 (2006).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (2006).
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they were regulated primarily at the local level. By 1996, however,
each service had become part of a large nationwide network in a
manner that should have, but did not, prompt greater reflection
upon the continuing relevance of this model. The next Part exam-
ines the problems that this historic segmented regulatory structure
has created for the modern telecommunications industry.
1I. MODERN FLAws IN THE HISTORICAL MODEL
The Telecommunications Act's preservation of the silo-based
model of regulation is built upon two related assumptions about
the telecommunications industry. First, the Act assumed without
much discussion that local telephone and cable service were still
properly considered "local" services. By continuing to locate juris-
diction over these services at the state level, the Act endorsed the
premise that the states' interest in regulation should trump that of
the Federal Communications Commission. Second, it assumed that
monoline telecommunications service would continue to dominate
the industry for the foreseeable future. Although the Act dreamed
of telecommunications convergence, the thrust of its reforms was
to increase intramodal competition. For example, the Act at-
tempted to break up local telephone monopolies not by
encouraging telephone service over cable lines, but by creating a
new class of monoline local exchange carriers, the CLECs, that
could compete head-to-head against the Baby Bells in the market
for voice services.
It is unclear whether these two assumptions remained valid even
in 1996. Even by then, voice and video services had departed sig-
nificantly from their local roots and were beginning to break free
from the architecture of their underlying platforms. But any vestig-
ial credibility these assumptions may have carried then has been
destroyed by technological developments in the twelve years since,
as diffusion and convergence have redefined the telecommunica-
tions landscape. The next Section explores these twin fallacies in
greater detail.
A. The Legal Fiction of "Local" Services
1. Telephone
Even by 1996, the label of "local" telephone service was some-
thing of a legal fiction. Ten years earlier, the Supreme Court had
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noted that while the 1934 Communications Act sought to "divide
the world of domestic telephone service neatly into two hemi-
spheres," the "realities of technology and economics belie such a
clean parceling of responsibility. '" 59 Typically, local telephone ser-
vice was no longer delivered by a small community-based
switchboard operator, but by one of seven multistate Regional Bell
Operating Companies.0 While these companies could only provide
intraLATA service pursuant to the terms of the 1984 consent de-
cree, the LATA boundaries were not drawn neatly along state
lines.6' The LATA map sought to reflect the calling patterns of sta-
tistic metropolitan areas, many of which are multistate in nature.
For example, LATA No. 236 covers the Washington, DC metropoli-
tan area, including the entire District of Columbia and substantial
portions of adjoining Maryland and Virginia. LATA No. 358 in-
cludes Chicago and adjoining suburbs in both Illinois and Indiana.
And LATA No. 546 covers both the Texas and Oklahoma panhan-
dles. 2 In these and other LATAs, many ostensibly "local" intraLATA
calls are in fact interstate in nature, yet are connected by local ex-
change carriers and regulated by state public utilities commissions
rather than by the FCC.
Even when a customer places a purely intrastate landline call
(i.e., between two residents of the same state), it is quite possible
that the signal crosses state lines on the way to the recipient. Tech-
nological advances have lowered the carriers' cost of transporting a
call along telephone lines, which allows carriers to move switching
equipment and ancillary services out of the local office and into
more centralized locations.63 This "delocalization, 64 of back-office
equipment means, for example, that a local call placed in Con-
necticut may travel to a switch in New York before being connected
59. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
60. It is worth noting that several independent telephone companies also offered local
telephone service in 1996, largely in areas unserved by the Baby Bells. General Telephone
(GTE), the largest of these independent non-Bell-affiliated entities, was a multistate service
provider whose size rivaled those of the Baby Bells.
61. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 317-18.
62. See id. Regional LATA maps can be found at http://www.latamaps.com/Telecom_
Maps/RegionalLATA maps/regionalilata maps.html (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
63. See Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in Telecommunications Regulations?, 3 Nw.
J. TECH. & INrrELL. PROP. 130, 132 (2005).
64. See id. As Sicker explains, this phenomenon is commonly described as "decentrali-
zation" because it moves facilities out of the "central" offices in each community. But this
term is a misnomer, as decentralization implies the diffusion of control rather than concen-
tration. As a result, this Article endorses Sicker's term "delocalization," which more
appropriately captures the essence of the phenomenon.
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back to a Connecticut recipient. 65 Ancillary "local" services such as
directory assistance and voicemail storage and retrieval are even
more centralized, often processed by a handful of call centers na-
tionwide and therefore routinely cross state lines despite being
regulated as "local" services.6 The Telecommunications Act recog-
nizes some of these jurisdictional oddities: for example, the Act
explicitly labels interLATA calls that cross state lines as "intrastate"
for regulatory purposes,67 which is nothing more than creative
statutory labeling that disregards the obvious fact that such calls
are in fact interstate.8
Notably, customers are increasingly unlikely to see a distinction
between intrastate and interstate calls in a way that justifies sepa-
rate regulatory regimes. As the Supreme Court noted, the
customer uses the same telephone, local loop, and local exchange
equipment to call next door as he does to call across the country.69
While the interstate call usually travels farther to get to its destina-
tion, the connection is virtually instantaneous and therefore the
additional distance is imperceptible to the communicating parties.
From the customer's perspective, a local call looks like an interstate
call, and therefore there is no reason to subject them to two differ-
ent regulatory regimes determined by the accident of geographic
proximity between the calling parties.
2. Cable
Similarly, the reality of modern cable networks undermines the
assumption that such activities are primarily local in scope. Cable
long ago evolved from its roots as a community-antenna retrans-
mission service for local broadcasts. Today, local rebroadcasts are
ancillary to cable's primary value proposition, the delivery of hun-
dreds of nationwide channels that provide original content
unavailable through over-the-air broadcasters. A cable television
station beams content from a fixed studio location to a satellite sys-
tem, which distributes the signal to receivers nationwide for
dissemination to cable subscribers. Even the local broadcasts that
cable operators provide are retransmissions of channels available
65. SeeCooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 317-18.
66. See id. at 318.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 221 (b) (2006).
68. Of course, there is no constitutional concern with Congress determining that, as a
policy matter, a service that crosses state lines should nonetheless be subject to state rather
than federal regulatory jurisdiction. The objection is to the labeling exercise hiding that this
is in fact what Congress is choosing to do.
69. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC., 476 U.S. 355,360 (1986).
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throughout the customer's metropolitan area, an area typically lar-
ger than the geographic reach of any individual local franchising
authority. °
Consolidation of cable operators has reinforced the national
scope of cable service. Even before the Telecommunications Act,
the locally-owned, standalone cable franchisee was an endangered
species. In 1994, two years before the Telecommunications Act, the
top four cable operators accounted for forty-seven percent of all
cable subscribers."' By June 2004, that figure had climbed to sixty
percent. 72 Notably, this concentration has largely occurred in clus-
ters, meaning that a single company acquires geographically
contiguous local franchises to serve larger areas: the FCC estimates
that by 2003, over eighty percent of cable customers received ser-
vice from a system that was part of a larger cluster of franchises.7"
Consolidation has concentrated the cable industry in a handful of
national networks that typically do not compete against one an-
other in a given area and that broadcast mostly national content in
the same manner to customers nationwide.
B. Diffusion and Convergence: The Destruction of
the Monoline Business Model
1. Technology Diffusion
The astounding technological advancements in the years since
the Telecommunications Act have challenged the second assump-
tion underlying local control, the continued dominance of
monoline service providers within a segmented telecommunica-
tions landscape. At first, this challenge came in the form of
technological diffusion, the provision of telephone and video ser-
vice through alternative network platforms that are not regulated
by states and localities. As increased tower density has improved
the quality of wireless communication, the cellular phone has risen
to be a formidable rival to traditional landline telephone service.
By 2007, wireless penetration reached eighty percent of the tele-
70. The migration from municipal to statewide cable franchises in Texas, California,
and other states renders this point less significant.
71. See Crandall et al., supra note 34, at 262 (citing Implementation of Section 19 of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442,
7586 app. G, at tbl. 1 (1994)).
72. Id. (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 143 (2005)).
73. Id. (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 1 142 (2005)).
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phone market. 74 From the consumer's perspective, a wireless call to
another customer within the state is an almost perfect substitute
for a landline call between the same parties. The FCC notes that
many regional wireless companies are competing directly against
landline local exchange carriers by offering unlimited local calling
for a flat fee each month just as local exchange carriers do.75 This
competition has had an effect on the traditional landline market:
between 2001 and 2006, the Baby Bells saw a twenty-three percent
decrease in the number of landlines they serviced, a phenomenon
that the FCC attributes in part to wireless substitution.76 Unlike lo-
cal landline service, however, wireless service is regulated primarily
at the federal level, with local authority mostly limited to cell
phone tower siting and consumer protection issues.77
Like wireless service, Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol ("VOIP") ser-
vice has challenged the notion that local calls must be made over a
local exchange. VOIP delivers intrastate (and interstate) voice
communications across the internet in the same way that email and
other data travel to one's computer. The voice transmission is bro-
ken into small packets of data, each of which travels over the most
efficient path available at a given instant, making it nearly impossi-
ble to determine whether a call has crossed state lines en route to
an in-state recipient.78 Moreover, customers can send and receive
calls anywhere in the world that an internet connection is available,
meaning that one cannot tell from a caller's address or phone
number whether the caller is in fact in-state for any given call.79 Be-
cause it is impossible to distinguish intrastate from interstate calls,
the FCC has held that VOIP service is jurisdictionally interstate and
80has preempted state and local regulation of the service .
Traditional cable service has also faced diffusion, in the form of
direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") television systems. DBS is not the
first technological rival to challenge cable's monopoly: in the 1980s
both wireless cable and direct-to-home ("DTH") satellite systems
developed as ultimately unsuccessful cable alternatives. But DBS
systems have recognized success where their predecessors failed,
due to technological advances and congressional action that
74. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, 244 (2008) (Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services).
75. Id. 250.
76. Id. 246.
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 322 (2006).
78. See Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22404, 8 (2004) (petition for declaratory
ruling concerning order of Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n) (mem. opinion and order).
79. Id. 9.
80. See generally id.
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facilitated cost-efficient retransmission of local broadcast stations
and delivery of cable content.8' Because DBS systems do not need
access to local public rights-of-way, they may deliver video content
to customers without having to seek a cable franchise agreement
from the city and thus escape many of the regulations that local
governments place upon traditional cable service.
Thus, through wireless service, VOIP service, and DBS systems,
consumers can, and increasingly do, receive near-perfect substi-
tutes for ostensibly local services, even though the substitutes are
almost entirely regulated at the federal level. This growing flight of
local telecommunications services to federally-regulated platforms
casts significant doubt upon the Telecommunications Act's implicit
premise that intrastate telephone and multichannel video services
are inherently local and must be regulated at the local level.
2. Technology Convergence
A related, and equally disruptive, phenomenon is technology
convergence, the ability to offer multiple telecommunications ser-
vices on the same platform. The Telecommunications Act's long-
term aspirations of convergence are rapidly becoming a reality,
most notably in the cable segment. Cable networks are no longer
merely the providers of subscription-based video services to cus-
tomers. For example, cable companies have become the nation's
leading providers of high-speed internet access: the FCC estimates
that just over fifty percent of residential high-speed internet lines,
and thirty-four percent of total high-speed lines in the United
States, rely upon cable modems to deliver internet content over
the cable industry's coaxial networks.82 As of 2007, high-speed cable
modem service was available to ninety-six percent of households
81. See Hildebrandt, supra note 37, at 238-39. Specifically, the advent of pizza-box-sized
satellite dishes allowed satellite customers to receive signals without erecting the behemoth,
and less reliable, receivers necessary for DTH satellite service. Similarly, the discovery of
"spot beams" made it feasible for DBS providers to rebroadcast local channels like cable.
Through the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, DBS satellite providers re-
ceived the right to retransmit these stations under a compulsory licensing scheme. 17 U.S.C.
§ 122 (2006).
82. See FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS
AS OFJUNE 30, 2007 (2008) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-280906A.pdf. The
study defined "high-speed" access as achieving download speeds in excess of 200 kilobytes
per second. Id. at 1 n.1. These statistics are based upon twice-annual reports on end-users
that all facilities-based internet providers must supply to the Commission pursuant to the
FCC's jurisdiction over internet services. Id. at 1 & n.2.
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that could receive cable television. s3 Cable companies are also in-
creasingly offering telephone service by leveraging VOIP
technology over their broadband lines.
Similarly, the Baby Bells and today's other local telephone ser-
vice providers offer much more than just local phone service. Most
telephone companies offer Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") Ser-
vice, which uses the telephone network's copper wires to carry
high-speed internet content alongside voice service. DSL is cable's
primary rival in the broadband access market, available in eighty-
two percent of U.S. households and constituting twenty-seven per-
cent of total high-speed internet lines.84 Verizon Communications
and AT&T, the two largest telephone companies and owners of
much of the Baby Bell infrastructure spun off under the 1984 con-
sent decree,85 have also begun to offer video services to rival that of
cable operators. Over the past ten years, the telephone companies
have spent billions of dollars to replace their traditional copper
wires with fiber-optic cable, an upgrade that dramatically improves
the quantity and quality of transmissions and was necessary to fa-
cilitate the delivery of video services throughout the network. 6
Wireless services are increasingly becoming a third potential
platform for the vaunted "triple play" of bundled
telecommunications services. As noted above, wireless voice
communication is increasingly supplanting landline telephone
service as the medium of choice for voice communication.
Companies such as Research in Motion, maker of the ubiquitous
BlackBerry device, have pioneered the delivery of e-mail, web
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. Verizon was formed by the 2000 merger of two RBOCs, NYNEX and Bell Atlantic,
plus General Telephone, the largest non-Bell-affiliated local telephone company in the
United States. Verizon, Corporate History, http://investor.veizon.com/profile/history/
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In 2005, Verizon acquired
MCI, the second-largest long distance provider in the United States. Id. The company cur-
rently known as AT&T stems from the late 1990s mergers of the Southwestern Bell, Pacific
Telesis, and Ameritech RBOCs, plus independent Bell system franchise Southern New Eng-
land Telephone. AT&T Investor Relations, http://www.att.com/gen/investor-relations?pid
=5711 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The combined
company, known as SBC Communications, acquired the AT&T long-distance company in
2005, and RBOC BellSouth in 2006, and currently does business under the AT&T name. Id.
86. Through Project U-Verse (formerly known as Project Lightspeed), AT&T has em-
barked upon a fiber-to-the-node (FITN) model that uses fiber-optic cable from the local
exchange office to neighborhood nodes, then traditional twisted-pair copper wire from the
neighborhood node to individual homes. AT&T U-verse, http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=5838 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Verizon's
FiOS program is centered upon a more ambitious, and more expensive, fiber-to-the-home
(FTrH) system that relies on fiber-optic cable exclusively throughout much of the FiOS
footprint. See Verizon FiOS TV, http://www22.verizon.com/residential/fiostv (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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browsing, and other data services through wireless handsets;
wireless companies such as AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless
increasingly offer this capability as well, and have introduced
adapters that allow consumers to use their wireless networks to
receive internet service on their laptops. And while wireless video
service is not yet a perfect substitute for traditional cable, MobiTV
currently streams multiple broadcast channels to the cell phones of
over four million subscribers."'
C. The Distortive Effects of Continued State-by-State Regulation
The diffusion of telecommunications services across multiple
platforms, and the convergence of multiple services on an individ-
ual platform, undercuts what residual justification remains for the
existing silo-based model of telecommunications federalism. To
the extent that states have an interest in regulating telephone or
cable service, its authority to do so is limited by the fact that cus-
tomers may now purchase nearly identical services through
federally-regulated networks such as DBS satellite television. And to
the extent that states' interest lies in regulating the underlying
landline telephone and cable networks, their regulatory authority
reaches only a portion of the networks operating within their juris-
diction. Furthermore, any interest in continued regulation of these
networks cannot justify the extension of authority to regulate some
(but not all) services traversing those networks.
Given these developments, continued state-by-state regulation of
some telecommunications services offered over some networks dis-
torts modern competition in at least four related ways:
* The need to classify new services and business mod-
els within the existing jurisdictional framework
leads to uncertainty, which can increase both the
cost and the delay of deploying these new services
for customers;
* Disparate regulatory schemes for similar services
distort competition by indirectly subsidizing less
regulated market players;
* Local regulation of national networks generates
negative externalities; and
87. See MobiTV, Our Technology, http://www.mobitv.com/technology/ (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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* Local barriers to entry insulate incumbent providers
from competition.
The balance of this Section explores these issues in turn.
1. Regulatory Uncertainty
The division of regulatory authority creates uncertainty when
telecommunications companies seek to offer new services that do
not fit within the clearly defined silos of federal and state jurisdic-
tion. Unless the FCC quickly resolves this uncertainty, state and
local decisionmakers will take it upon themselves to do so, and of-
ten generate inconsistent decisions in the process. This uncertainty
can discourage capital investment in telecommunications services
and delay the provision of new services to customers as companies
struggle to determine which rules they must satisfy.
The regulatory history of cable modem service demonstrates this
phenomenon. The FCC was quick to classify DSL as a "telecom-
munications service" subject to common carrier regulation under
the Telecommunications Act.88 But the Commission refused to pro-
vide similar guidance with regard to cable modem services. Some
local franchising authorities rushed to fill the regulatory vacuum
by declaring cable modem services to be "cable services" subject to
local regulation under the Act.90 With this label, local franchise au-
thorities could attach myriad conditions upon the provision of
cable modem service, such as requirements that the service be
made available to all interested customers, including resellers, on
reasonable terms and conditions.9' Cable operators sued to enjoin
88. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24030-31, 35-37 (1998). The FCC explained that high-
speed Internet access via DSL is actually two bundled services: access to the Internet, which
is a largely unregulated Title I information service, and underlying transmission of informa-
tion over the DSL line, which is a Title II common carrier service. Id. The upshot of this
holding was that common carrier obligations required telephone companies to sell the un-
derlying transmission service on an unbundled basis to other internet service providers,
which could package it with their own Internet service. Id. This regime ended when the FCC
reconsidered its earlier ruling in 2005. See infra note 94.
89. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 2 & n.10 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (describing
history of FCC treatment of service).
90. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2000);
MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715 (E.D. Va. 2000).
91. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 871; MediaOne Group, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
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the conditions, and the adjudicating courts reached inconsistent
92decisions regarding the proper classification of the service.
The uncertainty regarding how cable modem service should be
treated under the Act generated a wide range of ill effects. Cable
operators and municipalities invested substantial resources in liti-
gating these issues in district courts across the country. And would-
be investors that sought to achieve greater economics of scale
through consolidation of the cable industry found their efforts
thwarted by the inability to determine whether cable modem ser-
vice would be scalable. 93 The FCC did not resolve this issue until
2002, when it declared that cable modem service is an interstate
information service not subject to local regulation under Title VI.9'
2. Regulatory Disparity
The adoption of disparate regulatory schemes for similar ser-
vices can also distort consumer behavior by indirectly subsidizing
the network subject to the least amount of regulation. Absent regu-
latory disparity, consumers faced with the option of receiving
similar services from multiple vendors will choose the option that
best suits their needs. But if the government burdens one vendor
with regulations that increase the price or decrease the quality of
that vendor's service, consumers are likely to flock to the unregu-
lated competitor, even if they might have selected the regulated
vendor in the absence of the regulation. In this way, regulatory
disparity can distort competition, channel consumer behavior to-
ward suboptimal products, and ultimately lead to inefficient
allocations of shareholder capital.
92. Compare MediaOne Group, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (finding cable modem service is
"cable service"), with AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 878-80 (holding cable modem service is "tele-
communications service" delivered over cable network), and Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208
F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding Internet service provided by cable compa-
nies is not cable service, and that Internet service is not telecommunications service).
93. SeeAT&TCorp., 216 F.3d at 874-75; MediaOne Group, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
94. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 89, 1 7. Various parties challenged the order in
the Ninth Circuit, which considered itself bound by its earlier determination in AT&T Corp.
that cable modem service was a telecommunications service. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC,
345 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
Ninth Circuit and affirmed the FCC's classification, in the process not only resolving uncer-
tainty about the proper regulatory classification but also about the FCC's ability to
administratively overrule judicial decisions at odds with its interpretation of statutory ambi-
guities. National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
The FCC later reclassified DSL service as an information service as well, in part to assure that
similar services faced the same regulatory treatment regardless of the network architecture
underlying the service. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order].
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Diffusion and convergence give rise to numerous examples of
this phenomenon in the telecommunications industry. One com-
mentator has suggested that wireless telephone use has surpassed
landline use in part because wireless companies can offer custom-
ers bulk-minute monthly plans that do not distinguish between
local and long-distance use.95 The regulatory divide between local
and interstate landline telephone use, and residual state rate-
regulation of local service in many states, prevents landline com-
panies from offering a comparable bundle.
Similarly, the regulatory disparity between traditional cable and
DBS satellite service distorts the market for video services. As noted
above, traditional cable companies cannot provide service in a
community without agreeing to a franchise, which typically re-
quires them to pay franchise fees and agree to other concessions
that can consume five percent or more of gross revenues. 6 DBS
satellite companies provide a nearly identical bundle of goods, and
many consumers see satellite service as a near-perfect substitute to
traditional cable. But because satellite companies need not access
public rights of way to deliver service, they are not subject to the
franchising process.97 The overall result is to make satellite service
relatively less expensive, leading more customers to choose satellite
service (and more investors to dedicate capital to satellite compa-
nies) than would do so in the absence of regulatory disparity.
3. Negative Externalities of Local Regulation
The silo-based model of telecommunications regulation can also
create negative externalities. By their nature, state regulators seek
to maximize the social welfare of in-state residents: it is the local
population that they are charged to protect, and the local popula-
tion that will remove them from office if they fail to do so. While
they respond to the impact their rules will have on their constitu-
ents, they lack both the expertise and the incentive to consider the
95. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 338. Of course, the mobility advantage
that wireless services maintain over their landline counterparts is another, likely more sig-
nificant, factor. Id.
96. The Telecommunications Act explicitly permits these restrictions. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 541-42 (2006).
97. Cable companies are also routinely required to fund public, educational, and gov-
ernment access channels as a condition of receiving a franchise, a purpose explicitly
permitted under the Telecommunications Act. Id. § 531. Satellite networks are required to
set aside between four and seven percent of their channels for "noncommercial program-
ming of an educational or informational nature." Id. § 335(b) (1). It is unclear whether these
restrictions impose more of a burden on cable or satellite operators, which is why they are
excluded from the discussion above.
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effects that those rules may have on entities outside their jurisdic-
tion. This myopic focus can lead to overregulation, as policymakers
adopt rules that benefit their local constituencies but impose costs
on the nation as a whole. Sometimes it can also lead to underregu-
lation, as policymakers are tempted to avoid regulation that is
beneficial to the nation but would impose a substantial burden
upon state residents.9
Students of constitutional law are familiar with the negative ex-
ternalities of parochial economic legislation; these concerns
animate the dormant commerce clause doctrine.99 This doctrine
prohibits states from enacting legislation that improperly burdens
or discriminates against interstate commerce. "A discriminatory law
is virtually per se invalid and will survive only if it advances a le-
gitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."'00 In the classic dor-
mant commerce clause case, the Supreme Court invalidated a New
York order banning an out-of-state milk dealer from establishing
another dairy in New York for export. The order had shielded local
businesses from competition and protected New York consumers
from milk shortages, while the costs of the rule fell on out-of-state
shippers and consumers who have no input into the New York po-
litical process.'0 ' In such cases, the dormant commerce clause
denies the state the power "to place burdens on the flow of com-
merce across its borders that commerce wholly within those
borders would not bear.'
0 2
As telecommunications companies achieve national economies
of scale, the same concerns befall many state regulations aimed to
protect discrete segments of the local community. For example, a
state may require customer bills to include a clear explanation of
the state's consumer complaint procedures. This additional disclo-
sure benefits in-state customers by clarifying the mechanism for
disputing a charge. But it generates administrative costs, as the
company must reconfigure its systems to provide the required in-
formation. These costs are typically spread across the network,
falling on both in-state and out-of-state customers, meaning that
state regulators do not fully appreciate, or care to appreciate, the
98. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation ?, 56
FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 219-20 (2003) [hereinafter Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regula-
tion].
99. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330 (2007).
100. Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (internal quotation
marks, alteration, and citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
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true cost of their requirements to society as a whole. When this
phenomenon is multiplied by the countless potential parochial
interests animating each of fifty individual regulatory entities, the
collective overregulation can substantially burden the nationwide
provision of telecommunications service.
4. Local Barriers to Entry
Finally, state and local regulators serve as gatekeepers to the
markets they regulate, which allows them to demand unreasonable
concessions as conditions of market entry. This distortive behavior
is most obvious in the realm of cable regulation, where the local
franchise process-originally conceived in part to protect consum-
ers from monopoly practices-today largely serves to insulate
incumbent cable providers from competition. The public choice
concerns with local cable franchises have been exhaustively can-
vassed by the existing literature, perhaps most comprehensively by
Professor and former FCC Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett. 0 3 The
Telecommunications Act forbids the delivery of cable service with-
out a franchise from a local franchise authority, which is
authorized to charge a franchise fee of up to five percent of local
cable revenues and place other reasonable restrictions on the fran-
chise. 0 4 In practice, local franchise authorities use this power to
discourage competitors from entering a market, allowing the in-
cumbent monopolist to charge supra-competitive profits that are
shared with the local government through the franchise fee and
other conditions.
The anecdotal tales of abuse of discretion over local franchise
authority are legendary. In a recent report to the Commission, Ver-
izon listed conditions including the purchase of street lights,
wiring of all houses of worship, subsidized or free cellular phone
service for all city employees, the opening of a Verizon-owned
parking lot to library parking, and the connection of 220 traffic
signals with fiber-optic cable." Similarly, one municipality de-
manded that AT&T fund a local recreation center and pool, while
103. See generally Hazlett, Cable TVFranchises, supra note 40.
104. 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (2006). Technically, the Telecommunications Act only pro-
hibits local franchise authorities from "unreasonably refus[ing] to award an additional
competitive franchise." Id. § 541 (emphasis added). Local franchise authorities are therefore
free to impose even greater conditions upon the first franchisee in a territory, as long as the
franchise agreement does not grant an exclusive franchise over the territory.
105. See Implementation of Section 621(a) (1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 As Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101, 1 43 (2007) [hereinafter Cable Franchise Order].
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another would-be cable provider was forced to provide a $1 million
upfront application fee and a $50,000 scholarship fund with $7,200
in additional annual contributions. ' Local franchise authorities
typically do not count the cost of these additional conditions to-
ward the five percent cap that the Telecommunications Act
imposes on franchise fees.1 7 Yet by discouraging entry and increas-
ing the cost of service-costs that are passed on to cable
customers-these concessions distort the video market and lead to
anticompetitive results.
Once the local franchising authority grants an initial franchise,
the franchise fee creates a strong incentive to discourage competi-
tion. The local franchising authority receives five percent of the
gross cable revenues throughout the territory, meaning regulator
and regulated entity each has incentives to maximize the annual
revenue generated within an area. The monopoly prices extracted
by the incumbent also fund the numerous other perks attached as
conditions upon the franchise, such as public access channels. FCC
studies show that the introduction of competition within a fran-
chise territory reduces cable rates by an average of sixteen
percent.1°8 Although the local franchise authority would presuma-
bly receive the same five percent franchise fee from a new
competitive cable provider as it does from the incumbent, the re-
duced rates lead to lower overall cable revenues generated within
the franchise territory, which leads to lower aggregate franchise
fees collected by the local franchising authority.'09
Thus local franchising authorities have strong incentives to pre-
serve incumbent monopolists, and routinely use a wide range of
tactics to restrict competition. Perhaps the most obvious is simply
to delay the processing of the application for a competitive fran-
chise: the Telecommunications Act does not set a time frame
within which local franchise authorities must approve an applica-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 20 F.C.C.R. 2718, 1 29 (2005) (statistical report on average rates
for basic service, cable programming service and equipment).
109. Assuming that competition does not grow the number of subscribers sufficiently to
offset the decline in revenue from existing subscribers. The FCC estimated that in 2000 the
price elasticity of cable was 1.31, which "indicates that the demand for cable services is
somewhat price elastic." Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 15 F.C.C.R. 10927, 1 44 (2000) (report on cable
industry prices). But given that, by FCC 2005 estimates, only fourteen percent of U.S.
households do not subscribe to a multichannel video service to receive television signals,
there simply are not that many potential subscribers left to entice with lower rates. See In the
Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 1 96 (2006).
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tion, so the municipality can, and often does, take as much time as
possible to review an application. One report estimates that the
franchising process takes an average of eight to sixteen months to
complete. ° Verizon reported to the FCC that of the 113 franchise
applications that were pending in March 2005, only ten had been
granted by March 2006. "1 As the FCC has noted, these delays are
especially unjustified when the competitive applicant is a tele-
phone company, which already has access to rights-of-way in the
franchise territory and has already installed most of the infrastruc-
ture necessary to deliver video service.1
2
Local franchise authorities also routinely enforce "level playing
field" restrictions that seek to guarantee that the competitive en-
trant receives a franchise on terms no more favorable than those
enjoyed by the incumbent, but in effect raise the costs of entry suf-
ficiently to preserve the municipality's monopoly interest in the
existing franchise.1 1 3 Sometimes these restrictions require the ap-
plicant to construct an entirely duplicative studio for public,
educational, and governmental access, or to reimburse the incum-
bent for half of the costs it had incurred in satisfying its public
access requirements. 1 4 These restrictions also routinely include a
"buildout" requirement, ostensibly to prevent the incumbent from
"redlining" lower-income neighborhoods by requiring the appli-
cant to provide service in all franchise areas currently served by the
incumbent provider.1 5 Of course, such requirements ignore the
fact that the incumbent established its footprint over time, funded
by monopoly profits that are unavailable to the competitive service
provider.1
16
These buildout requirements are particularly problematic for
telephone companies seeking to enter the video market, since the
incumbent cable company's footprint likely does not precisely map
the telephone company's existing footprint." 7 Therefore, to
110. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, 22.
111. Id.
112. Id. 923.
113. In some states, incumbent cable operators have successfully lobbied to get level
playing field restrictions adopted within the state's code. See id. 47.
114. See id. 46.
115. Id. 31-32. Of course, true red-lining restrictions are important, as customers
should not be denied the benefits of competition on the basis of their income. But buildout
requirements are both over- and under-inclusive when it comes to preventing red-lining:
wiring the incumbent's footprint mandates service to all customers, not just low-income
ones, while the requirement may actually encourage red-lining if the incumbent has itself
avoided providing income to low-income residents. It is also worth noting that the Tele-
communications Act explicitly prohibits red-lining. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (3) (2006).
116. See Hazlett, Cable TVFranchises, supra note 40, at 125, 130-46.
117. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, 33.
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provide video service to existing telephone customers in a
community, the telephone company must expand its telephone
franchise and build telephone lines to the balance of the commu-
nity who are already served by one or more telephone providers-
an act which could necessitate the approval of (or even be barred
by) the separate regulatory entity governing local telephone
service. And where the telephone company's footprint spans that
of two or more incumbent cable franchisees, the buildout re-
quirement could force it to install new infrastructure throughout
both incumbents' service areas in order to provide video service to
its existing customers.
Concerned about the effects of this behavior on video competi-
tion, the FCC intervened in 2007 to rein in many of these abuses.
The Telecommunications Act prohibits local franchise authorities
from "unreasonably" refusing to award a competitive franchise."8
To enforce this prohibition, the FCC promulgated several
franchise guidelines, departure from which is presumptively unrea-
sonable under the Act. These guidelines include the approval of
franchise applications within ninety days for companies with
existing access to city rights-of-way and six months otherwise, a
prohibition on "unreasonable" buildout mandates and PEG re-
quirements, including forcing a telephone company to build out
beyond its existing footprint, and the deduction of the cost of all
non-cable-related conditions from the statutory five percent cap on
franchise fees. 9
In essence, the Commission has federalized the local franchise
process, reducing the opportunities for local rent-seeking by cabin-
ing the discretion that local officers hold over market entry.
Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein's dissent clearly stated just how
much this order infringes upon the traditional prerogatives of the
states.2° These rules helped solve the most egregious abuses of the
local franchising process, and likely represent the outer boundary
of the Commission's current authority to address the problem.
12 1
But the Commission's efforts to layer federal guidelines upon an
antiquated state regulatory model are reminiscent of the "epicycles
upon epicycles" posited to preserve Ptolemy's geocentric model
118. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a).
119. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, 11 53-120.
120. See id. at 5193-95 (Adelstein, Comm'r, dissenting) ("[T]oday's Order is legislation
disguised as regulation.... [It is] a clear rebuke of [our] storied relationship with local
government.... [and] breathtaking in its disrespect of our local and state government
partners.... .").
121. The Sixth Circuit recently upheld the Commission's order as a reasonable inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 786-87
(6th Cir. 2008).
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from mounting counterevidence. 2 2 Ptolemy theorized that all
planets orbited the Earth in perfect circular orbits.' But as the
planets failed to appear in the places that Ptolemy's model pre-
dicted, scientists modified the model, first by suggesting that
perhaps planets moved in epicycles upon these orbits, then by sug-
gesting that perhaps they moved in epicycles upon those
epicycles. 12 4 In reality, of course, these increasingly complex efforts
to save the Ptolemaic model were misplaced, because it was the
model itself that was flawed: Copernicus explained that science was
better served by eliminating Ptolemy's geocentric model com-
pletely and instead working from a heliocentric worldview.
125
Similarly, effective telecommunications reform must involve a
comprehensive review of the outdated scheme perpetuated by the
Telecommunications Act. The tendency toward incremental re-
form is largely responsible for the flaws in the current silo-based
model: "lawmakers simply wrote a new law for each new network as
it arrived"26 without considering how new technologies affect exist-
ing networks or whether changes in the network over time affect
the initial allocation of jurisdiction between the federal govern-
ment and the states. Today's telecommunications marketplace
makes multiple services available over a variety of competing plat-
forms. Continuing to entertain the fiction that some subset of
these services are "local" when offered over certain networks (but
not others) distorts consumer choice and hinders the development
of an efficient nationwide telecommunications network.
Comprehensive reform is necessary to permit telecommunica-
tions law to catch up to the realities of the modern network.
Congress should replace the existing silo-based model of telecom-
munications federalism with a model that conceives of the industry
as a single telecommunications network that offers a variety of po-
tential services over multiple competing platforms. Jurisdictional
separation should be accomplished on a platform-neutral basis to
minimize the regulatory uncertainty and disparity that plague the
122. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communi-
cations, 5J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. LAW 15, 19 (2006). Of course, there was sometimes a
significant gap between the development of technology and its immolation in the Tele-
communications Act: for example, the 1984 Cable Act came thirty years after the first
community antenna systems developed and twenty years after the FCC's myriad forays into
regulation without authority. The point is that when determining how to regulate a given
segment of the communications industry, Congress typically considered the segment in
isolation without a view toward a more comprehensive communications policy.
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current regime. And regulators should divide authority between
the federal government and states in a manner that limits the op-
portunities for negative externalities and the erection of local
barriers to entry. The next Part sketches a framework for this new
model.
III. TOWARD A NEW COOPERATIVE MODEL OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FEDERALISM
A. Defending the Purpose of Telecommunications Regulation
Before outlining a framework for the appropriate division of
regulatory authority between the federal government and the
states, it is useful to identify the purpose that such regulation
should serve. In this respect, the purposes of both the 1934
Communications Act and its 1996 counterpart remain valid today,
even if their execution was somewhat flawed. Then, as now, tele-
communications policy should seek "to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide ... wire and radio communication service with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable charges.' 27 To this end, the proper
jurisdictional arrangement should minimize restrictions upon the
rapid deployment of existing and new technologies to customers
while promoting competition as the primary vehicle to bring inex-
pensive telecommunications service to as much of the population
as possible.
Telecommunications service is more than simply one among
many goods vying for a share of a consumer's wallet. The tele-
communications network is the primary conduit through which an
individual interacts with the broader community. Through voice,
video, and internet service, one can learn about topics ranging
from politics to pop culture and participate in individual and na-
tional dialogues. Telecommunications networks are the arteries
and veins through which information flows in society; the ability to
participate in that network is so integral to life in the information
age that Mira Burri Nenova describes access as a modern human
right.1
Individuals connected to the network have an incentive for as
many others to join as possible. Naturally, the value of a sub-
scriber's network connection increases with each additional person
127. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
128. Mira Burri Nenova, The New Concept of Universal Service in a Digital Networked Com-
munications Environment, 3 I/S:J.L. & POL'v FOR INFO. Soc'v 117 (2007).
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that this connection can reach. One sees this logic in advertise-
ments by wireless companies that tout the size of their respective
networks: subscribers can reach in-network subscribers on better
terms than customers of rival carriers, so it is advantageous to sign
up with the network that grants preferential access to as many po-
tential subscribers as possible (or at least, as many people as
possible that one is likely to talk to). But more metaphysically, each
new individual added to the network contributes a unique perspec-
tive to social dialogue. Just as individuals benefit from being able to
learn from and contribute to the exchange of information in soci-
ety, the community is enriched by a wide range of voices each
adding a unique contribution to national culture. Advanced tele-
communications lowers information costs, which reduces barriers
to the exchange of knowledge and allows individuals greater op-
portunities to accumulate the social capital that forms the basis of a
larger community.
1 29
With the advent of convergence, intermodal competition among
carriers has become a powerful force in pursuit of this statutory
end. Like most network industries, telecommunications is an in-
dustry with significant fixed costs stemming from the development
and maintenance of nationwide network infrastructure. Because
fixed costs are high and variable costs are small, each telecommu-
nications company seeks to serve as many consumers as possible
within its footprint, to spread those fixed costs over as broad a sub-
scriber base as it can and lower the average cost of service to all
customers.1 3 At the same time, pressure from competing telecom-
munications providers keep prices low, particularly now that
intermodal competition has increased the opportunities for cus-
tomers to purchase near-perfect substitutes for a given company's
product.
129. See generaUy ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2001).
130. This discussion sets aside, for the moment, the special case of certain rural cus-
tomers who cannot be connected without significant additional capital investments to build
out to their communities. For these customers, the variable cost of reaching these customers
can be greater than the revenue they would generate, and other subscribers are unlikely to
voluntarily make up the gap in increased fees. One may note that diffusion and convergence
have the potential to reduce the number of customers to whom it is cost-inefficient to pro-
vide service, because it offers a variety of potential network architectures that might be able
to profit from outlying customers. For example, a particular rural area may be so far re-
moved from the existing telephone network that building a landline telephone connection
to the community is cost-prohibitive. But the installation of a cell phone tower may provide
much of the same service via wireless platforms at a much smaller cost. Nonetheless, this
Article recognizes that even in a converged world there may exist certain pockets of the
nation who are unlikely to receive telecommunications service without the aid of a universal
service program. The special case of universal service is discussed in Part III.C.4 below.
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B. The Jurisdictional Principle of Neutrality
It flows from this overarching purpose that the line between
federal and state jurisdiction should be drawn in a way that lever-
ages the institutional strengths of each level of government while
minimizing disruption on intermodal competition. To accomplish
this goal, Congress should adopt a jurisdictional principle of neu-
trality. Rather than simply tweaking the current silo-based model,
Congress should conceive of the telecommunications industry as a
single unified network that offers multiple services over several
competing platforms. It should then ask what aspects of this net-
work are best regulated at the national and local levels and draw
jurisdictional boundaries in a content- and platform-neutral man-
ner.
To clarify, this Article does not necessarily endorse a regulatory
principle of neutrality that would bind the FCC or its state ana-
logues. There may be important policy reasons for the FCC to
regulate some telecommunications services differently than others.
For example, it may adopt a universal service program for voice or
internet communication but not video service upon determining
that voice and internet service are more integral to participation in
the information economy than video is. Similarly, local govern-
ment may adopt different rules for permitting cell phone towers
than laying cable lines, because each affects the community differ-
ently. This Article does not focus upon the policy choices that
federal and state regulators should make within their respective
spheres of authority. Rather, it focuses upon where the boundaries
of those spheres should be drawn: in essence, it answers the ques-
tion who decides a particular issue of telecommunications law,
while leaving open the question of what the decision should be.
The jurisdictional principle of neutrality reduces the first two
problems discussed above with the current silo-based model of
telecommunications federalism. Under a content- and platform-
neutral regime, the FCC would be responsible for determining all
questions about a particular aspect of network regulation, while
states would be responsible for others, regardless of which plat-
forms those services traverse on their way to the consumer.
Therefore, companies suffer less regulatory uncertainty: they need
not guess whether a new idea is more like cable, video, or internet
service before knowing which governmental authority will set the
rules. Regulatory disparity would also largely be eliminated, as the
same entity would craft the rules without regard to the accident of
the platform over which the service is to be provided.
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C. Regulation at the Federal Level: Controlling Spillover Effects and
Preserving National Economies of Scale
The jurisdictional principle of neutrality is only part of the solu-
tion: one must still determine which activities should be regulated
at which levels of government. The answer to this question turns
upon the relative strengths of federal and local regulation. As
Charles Cooper and Brian Koukoutchos note, "[o]ne does not
lightly displace the regulatory powers of sovereign states."03 1 Decen-
tralization of authority and institutional respect for state
sovereignty are widely considered to be the hallmarks of "Our Fed-
eralism" 132  and promote important values such as policy
experimentation, responsiveness to local concerns, and account-
ability by public figures who are closer to the subjects they
govern. But as illustrated above, local regulation can harm society
as a whole if local action generates spillover effects that the state
does not consider when weighing the cost and benefits of an initia-
tive.3 In this sense, it is important to remember that the framers
added the Commerce Clause precisely to eliminate economic trade
barriers that had grown up between the states under the Articles of
Confederation. 33 "The Constitutional Convention was held in 1787
precisely because the states had shown themselves to be, by their
vary nature as separate and competing sovereigns, incompetent to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce.' 36 The optimal model
of jurisdictional separation captures the benefits of decentraliza-
tion as much as possible, while controlling the spillover effects that
Our Federalism can otherwise generate.
3 7
It flows from these observations that federal preemption is most
appropriate over activities that, if left in the hands of the states,
would threaten to generate negative externalities that would un-
reasonably disrupt a broader national objective. Preemption's
primary benefit is uniformity: by replacing a patchwork of myopic
131. Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 299.
132. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
133. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 53-62
(2004).
134. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177; see also Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Book Review, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1495 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN
(1987)).
135. Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 300-01.
136. Id.
137. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177 ("Selection
of the optimal jurisdiction largely reduces to a search for the smallest unit of government
(lowest tier) that substantially avoids 'beggar thy neighbor' outcomes from decentralized
policy making.").
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state regulators with a single federal decisionmaker, preemption
eliminates spillover effects, at least in the sense described above,
because the regulator presides over a polity large enough to inter-
nalize most costs of regulation.1 3 Preemption also has the added
benefits of reducing uncertainty: a company can plan to deploy a
service nationwide because it knows with certainty the legal frame-
work that will govern the service in all places it is offered. And
preemption could lower the transaction costs of regulatory activi-
ties: a company need only go to a single federal authority to seek
regulatory action, guidance, or exemption, whereas those costs are
multiplied fifty-fold (or more) under a state-regulated system.
In network industries such as telecommunications, preemption
is often appropriate when inconsistent state laws generate spillover
effects that prevent companies from achieving interstate econo-
mies of scale. 139 Economies of scale allow a company to deliver a
good cheaper and more efficiently by expanding its scale of pro-
duction. Through expansion, the company can spread its fixed
costs over a larger volume of sales, which reduces the average cost
of each unit and therefore lowers the price of its goods for con-
sumers. State regulators often undervalue interstate economies of
scale, and can enter inconsistent regulations that prevent compa-
nies from achieving efficient growth.1 40 An identical regulatory
structure throughout the country allows companies in these indus-
tries to avoid these state regulatory hurdles.
Through this analytical lens, it becomes clear that Congress
should preempt most economic regulation of telecommunications
networks. State and local regulation of economic activity often has
spillover effects that prevent telecommunications companies from
achieving economies of scale.'41 As noted above, telecommunica-
tions companies incur substantial capital costs to build and
upgrade their networks and benefit from national economies of
scale by spreading those costs over as many customers as possible.
Indeed, the push for convergence is itself an effort to achieve
greater economies of scale by increasing the amount of revenue
138. Of course, it is conceivable that a national regulation could impose negative exter-
nalities on residents of other countries. These concerns lay beyond the scope of this Article.
139. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177 (citing Da-
vid F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law:
Eliminating the "Gray"Behind the "Green", 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 1004 (1993)).
140. See id. at 176 ("Importantly, it occurs not just when property rights are ill-defined
(the Coasian sense of 'externality'), but when economies of scale extend across states. Then
the highly complementary nature of supplying consumers in multiple political jurisdictions
produces costs and benefits which may largely go unnoticed by regulatory authorities."
(internal citation omitted)).
141. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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derived from each dollar invested in the network. Federal preemp-
tion of state economic regulations will help telecommunications
companies achieve Congress's objective of providing telecommu-
nications services to the largest number of people at the lowest
cost.
1. Rate Regulation
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the states retain ju-
risdiction to regulate rates for intrastate telephone service 142 and,
under very limited circumstances that rarely vest, cable television
service. 43 Historically, as discussed above, this rate regulation was
justified to assure that these utilities did not charge supra-
competitive rates due to their monopoly positions.' 44 But histori-
cally, state public utility commissions have used their telephone
ratemaking authority not to assure that rates remained closely tied
to costs, but as a mechanism to fund universal service by cross-
subsidizing rural telephone service with above-cost rates in more
populated areas.'1 While the Telecommunications Act sought to
encourage new competitors to challenge the Baby Bells, this artifi-
cial rate structure "offered distorted price signals to new market
entrants" which made it difficult to determine how, or where, new
entry would be profitable. 146 These distortions also likely skewed
consumer behavior once wireless and VOIP technology arrived to
compete directly against landline service, by overstimulating cus-
tomers to adopt new technology in areas where rates were
artificially high, and understimulating such behavior where rates
were artificially low.'47
To correct these distortions and allow intermodal competition to
flourish, Congress should repeal the prohibition on federal regula-
tion of intrastate communications service, 48 preempt state rate
regulation of telecommunications services, and vest authority over
any continued rate regulation in the FCC. Rate regulation is the
classic example of an activity which, if decentralized, is likely to dis-
tort competition by imposing negative externalities on the rest of
the system. In a national telecommunications system, most costs
142. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2006).
143. Id. § 543.
144. See supra text accompanying note 40.
145. See Kyle D. Dixon & Philip J. Weiser, A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm for
Federal-State Relations, 4J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321, 333 (2006).
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
148. See47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
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are borne at the national level, including network building and
upkeep, the maintenance of centralized support services such as
call centers and corporate offices, and national advertising cam-
paigns. As a result, pricing is most efficiently set at the national
level as well, to make sure that the company adequately recovers its
national costs.
State-by-state interference with this pricing mechanism is likely
to distort competition, even if we assume that states manage to set
rates on a platform-neutral basis. A statewide price cap will cause
companies to raise prices throughout the remainder of their foot-
print to compensate for lost revenue. Similar behavior by multiple
states will artificially depress companies' rates of return, causing
them to underinvest in new network capabilities in order to re-
cover the foregone revenue. Even if states cross-subsidize rates
within the state to control externalities as they have done histori-
cally, the result will be overconsumption of telecommunications
services in some areas and underconsumption in others, which dis-
torts the incentives of potential competitors who seek to enter the
business.
As a simple hypothetical, assume that the New Hampshire Public
Utilities Commission determines that wireless telephone rates are
too high and adopts a state-wide cap on prices per minute of use to
New Hampshire subscribers at a rate below that which wireless
companies currently charge. In the short run, this measure may
benefit New Hampshire consumers, who receive cheaper wireless
phone service. But this rate regulation has an adverse effect on
wireless subscribers outside New Hampshire, who now must pay
higher wireless rates to fund what is, in effect, a subsidy to New
Hampshire consumers. Out-of-state customers must also shoulder
the additional administrative costs of identifying, tracking, and bill-
ing New Hampshire customers separately from the rest of the
customer base. If these costs are too high, one or more wireless
companies may decide to abandon the New Hampshire market.
This would have an adverse effect on New Hampshire residents,
who would no longer benefit from wireless service and the com-
petitive pressures that wireless services place upon other forms of
voice communication.
Professor Hazlett has shown empirically how federal preemption
of state rate regulation over wireless carriers allowed these compa-
nies to achieve greater economies of scale and to offer service to
more customers at lower prices. 49 Congress preempted state regu-
149. See generally Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98.
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lation of wireless rates in 1993, over the objection of many state
public utility commissions that preemption would lead to anticom-
petitive rates and discriminatory practices.1 5 1 In reality, total
wireless minutes of use grew dramatically in the following decade,
while rates have declined. 152 Preemption of state rate authority,
coupled with the lifting of other restrictions on the industry, al-
lowed wireless companies to build efficient national networks and
offer nationwide calling plans, while promoting competition
among wireless carriers. 53 The FCC has noted that "operators with
larger footprints can achieve certain economies of scale and in-
creased efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints"
and that "[o]ne of the driving forces behind [industry consolida-
tion] has been the desire of large regional carriers to enhance
their ability to compete with existing nationwide operators that
offer attractive nationwide pricing plans.'
5 4
The Digital Age Communications Act ("DACA") working group
has also generally endorsed preemption of state rate regulation.
1 5 5
DACA was a draft bill proposed in 2005 to revolutionize telecom-
munications regulation, although Congress did not act on the
proposal. 55 Borne of the collective deliberation of several luminar-
ies in the field of telecommunications regulation, the DACA
project sought to replace the Telecommunications Act with a
broad, platform-neutral prohibition on unfair competition in tele-
communications, thus transforming the FCC into an adjudicatory
agency similar to the Federal Trade Commission.157 As part of this
proposed shift, DACA envisioned a smaller role for state regulation
of economic activity going forward, although it provided for con-
tinued rate regulation of basic service as a type of universal service
subsidy, at least for an initial transition period. This retention
150. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
151. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 207.
152. Id. at 213. Hazlett notes that:
The proconsumer improvements may not be due to deregulation, and FCC reports
tend to attribute the rate declines beginning about the time of federal preemption to
the anticipated entry of PCS competitors. What can be said, however, is that the pre-
diction of several state public service commissions is rejected by marketplace
evidence. State regulation did not generally lower rates or benefit consumers.
Id.
153. See id. at 198.
154. See id. at 198-99 (quoting Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, 12998 (2002)).
155. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 334-35, 357.
156. SeeDigital Age Communications Act of 2005, S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005).
157. Id.
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would be problematic for numerous reasons, particularly if the
Commission permitted it to continue beyond DACA's suggested
interim period, First, these existing rate plans affect only local
landline service, and thus perpetuate the competitive disadvantage
that landline providers face against wireless and VOIP providers.'58
They also retain the somewhat artificial distinction between local
and long-distance service, which competitive forces may otherwise
seek to eliminate. 5 ' Congress can better address the universal ser-
vice concerns animating this carveout through a Commission-
administered universal service program, as described below."
2. Market Entry and Legacy Conditions on Cable Franchises
Congress should also eliminate the existing franchise system and
preempt existing state and local authority to regulate market entry.
As discussed in detail above, local control over market entry has
led to significant distortions in the video market. Local franchising
authorities routinely demand concessions in exchange for a fran-
chise, which artificially increases the cost of video service.' 6' It then
splits near-monopoly profits with the incumbent and uses the fran-
chise power as a barrier to entry to limit the effects competition
may otherwise have on overall video prices.6 2 The combined effect,
as with rate regulation, is to deter investment in video services and
lock consumers in to artificially high video rates.
Like ratemaking, market entry is a quintessentially national ac-
tivity. Entry into new markets is an important way that
telecommunications providers can increase economies of scale and
reduce the overall cost to consumers of providing telecommunica-
tions service. With few exceptions, telecommunications providers
offer essentially the same service across markets. A Comcast sub-
scriber is likely to get a near-identical package of channels to
choose from whether he is in San Francisco or Nashville, because it
is in the broadcasters' and the cable companies' interests to dis-
tribute particular content as widely as possible. Local regulation of
market entry can impose negative costs on out-of-state subscribers
by disrupting economies of scale and perpetuating the rent-seeking
behavior discussed in depth above. Therefore any restrictions
should be administered solely by the Commission.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
159. See supra text accompanying note 95.
160. See infra Part III.C.4.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
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Losing the power of the franchise means that local authorities
will lose the power to mandate the numerous conditions they place
on incumbent and would-be competitor cable companies, such as
buildout requirements and public, educational, and government
access channels. But given the distortive effects these requirements
have had on the cable market, this loss is likely to be a boon to
consumers and to Congress's overarching objectives. To the extent
that buildout requirements act as a surrogate for a type of video
universal service program, these concerns are better addressed at
the Commission level through a federal universal service program
as discussed below. With regard to public access channels, if the
local franchise authority finds these resources are useful to the
community, they should fund the channels directly instead of foist-
ing the cost of an inherently local good on the entire
telecommunications network.
A more difficult question arises when one realizes the loss of lo-
cal revenue that is likely to result from this transfer. Local
governments increasingly rely on the funding that they receive
from cable franchise fees to support any number of general pur-
poses. John Lindsay, former mayor of New York, once described
cable franchises as "urban oil wells beneath our city streets. '"'63 The
preemption of local franchise agreements would leave a significant
gap in municipal budgets nationwide. For this reason, DACA pro-
posed a three-to-five year phase-in period whereby existing
franchises will remain in force while local governments begin to
plan for the eventual loss of cable revenue. 4 Although this transi-
tion period would perpetuate the distortive effects that franchising
places upon the telecommunications market, it may be politically
necessary to achieve the scope of reform necessary to adapt to a
converged industry. But this rationale does not support DACA's
supplemental recommendation that new entrants, such as tele-
phone companies, pay a similar franchise fee before offering
competing services during this interim period.1 6 5 DACA proposed
this additional fee to maintain competitive neutrality during the
transition. But this interim retention is a concession to the political
reality of dramatic change and should distort the market no more
163. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises, supra note 40, at 9 (quoting Albin Krebs, Cities Reas-
sured on Cable TVRights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1973, at 73).
164. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 352. Cities may try to recover this revenue
simply by imposing a tax on video (or all telecommunications) services in an amount neces-
sary to offset the foregone revenue. This is a suboptimal solution, as it simply relabels the
distortive effects of the current regime. Perhaps anticipating this eventuality, DACA recom-
mends anticipatorily preempting any state or local tax on any telecommunications service.
See id. at 354.
165. Seeid.at352.
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than necessary to soften the financial blow of preemption. A grad-
ual phase-out of existing franchise fees gives cities time to find new
funding sources, but foisting similar requirements on new entrants
would constitute an unjustified additional municipal windfall at
consumers' expense.
3. Access Issues
At least with regard to telephone service, the Telecommunica-
tions Act granted states authority over interconnection agreements
between the Baby Bells and new competitive local exchange pro-
viders and the arbitration of interconnection-related disputes,
pursuant to a scheme that the Commission would decide. 66 Dele-
gating this responsibility to the states made sense in 1996, when
Congress anticipated a rush of interconnection agreements that
would destroy the old state-regulated monopoly system. Because
the states were the historic rate regulators of the incumbent local
exchange carriers, they understood local markets better than the
Commission and therefore were in a superior position to decide
local interconnection-related disputes.
But now that the initial wave of CLEC interconnection has
passed, that local knowledge is less relevant. Therefore, authority
over future interconnection or other issues regarding access to an
individual company's network should be vested with the Commis-
sion. At its core, interconnection and other access-related disputes
are simply versions of a market entry problem, and should be regu-
lated by the Commission for precisely the reasons that entry
generally should be. The Commission will take an appropriately
national view of a local access dispute, determining whether the
incumbent carrier's actions are reasonable in light of the costs and
benefits to society as a whole. Otherwise, continued local regula-
tion of interconnection disputes carries the risk of local favoritism
and other negative externalities that plagued the development of
cable competition.
4. Universal Service
Universal service poses a somewhat more difficult problem. Uni-
versal access is currently a hybrid program, administered largely by
individual states through surcharges on state bills but supple-
166. See47 U.S.C. §§ 251,252 (2006).
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mented by a modest federal universal service fund funded by sur-
charges on interstate calls.'67 Both state and federal programs serve
to subsidize telecommunications service for low-income consumers
and consumers who live in high-cost areas such as rural counties
where fixed costs are spread over fewer people.
Though the case is somewhat closer, responsibility for admini-
stration of the universal service program should similarly be vested
in the Commission. States may argue that the demand for universal
service turns upon the number of low-income and high-cost
households, a figure that varies by jurisdiction. As a rural state,
Iowa likely has a greater demand for universal service funds than
New Jersey, and state regulators are in a better position to quantify
that demand. But ultimately, universal service is a national, not a
local, goal. The need for a universal service program stems directly
from Congress's goal of encouraging deployment of telecommuni-
cations services to as many residents as possible. And the benefits
of universal service accrue nationally by allowing all existing cus-
tomers to reach underserved segments of society through the
national telecommunications network. To minimize the distortion
that universal service places upon competitive markets, it should
be funded nationally rather than locally, so the costs of universal
service are internalized by all who benefit. Allocating responsibility
to states instead risks inconsistencies in the definition of universal
service eligibility, the types of service to which one is entitled, and
the costs imposed on the rest of society. A national standard for
eligibility promotes uniformity and predictability and minimizes
the market distortions of this important goal.
There are also lower transaction costs associated with a unified
federal program. A single central node for the collection and
distribution of universal service funds reduces the administrative
costs of the program on the industry. The value of these
administrative economies of scale is obvious even in the present
regulatory environment: at least thirteen state USF funds have
delegated administration of their programs to Solix, the same
vendor that manages portions of the existing federal universal
service program.Iee This outsourcing demonstrates the value of
scale and undermines, to an extent, the states' interest in
executing the day-to-day management of a universal service
program.
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006); see also Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393, 424 (5th Cir. 1999) (limiting federal universal service fund fee to percentage of
interstate charges).
168. About Solix, http://www.solixinc.com/internet/source/aboutsolix.aspx?id=34 (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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D. Regulation at the State Level: Leveraging
Local Knowledge and Experimentation
Of course, the uniformity and predictability that preemption
provides do not come without cost. A uniform federal scheme has
difficulty adapting to the demands of unique local circumstances.
Federal regulators lack familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of local
markets, and even when they become aware of the need for a local-
ized rule, they may lack the incentive to take action that would
benefit only a small segment of the national population.
Not surprisingly, the merits of decentralization largely offset the
problems posed by preemption (and vice versa). A decentralized
regime brings decisionmaking closer to the people affected by
regulation. 69 Local governments are responsible for a much
smaller polity than their federal counterparts, and therefore are in
a better position to know and respond to local concerns. " ° This
greater responsiveness encourages public participation and ac-
countability, and more broadly may foster the development of
social capital that helps make a community greater than the sum of
its parts. 7'
Decentralization of authority also promotes regulatory diversity
that, under certain circumstances, can lead to improved policy
outcomes. As Justice Kennedy aptly summarized, when "consider-
able disagreement exists about how best to accomplish [a] goal,"
"the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to de-
vise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear."
7 2
The benefits of this diversity are two-fold: first, regulators are free
to tailor individual policies to the unique circumstances of their
localities rather than suffer from a one-size-fits all policy man-
date. 17 And second, citizens who disagree with a policy are free to
"vote with their feet" by relocating to a more hospitable regulatory
climate; as jurisdictions modify their policies to compete for such
residents, society arrives at an efficient level of provision of public
services.
174
169. SeeYoung, supra note 133, at 58.
170. See id. at 59 ("Officials ought to look their constituents in the eye on the street and
see them in the grocery store." (quoting Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 317, 395 (1997))).
171. SeeJason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 27,29 (2001).
172. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (KennedyJ, concurring).
173. SeeYoung, supra note 133, at 53.
174. SeeCharles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of LocalExpenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
Of course, voting with one's feet is expensive. Tiebout's model only really affects those pub-
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Of course, these benefits are not universally applicable to all pol-
icy questions. "Public participation and accountability" could
alternatively be described as "myopic focus on local needs," while
"regulatory diversity" could be a euphemism for "piecemeal regula-
tion." As noted above, there is substantial risk that the state
regulator's overt focus on local preferences can generate negative
externalities that impose costs on other states. As Judge Michael
McConnell notes, "[e]xternalities present the principal counter-
vailing consideration in favor of centralized government."17 5
It follows from these observations that decentralized authority is
best where the issue in question is primarily local in scope. Or in
Professor Hazlett's terms, "the advantage of differentiation lies in
the informational efficiencies local regulators enjoy relative to the
advantages of scale economies they sacrifice (or disrupt)."" Where
markets are largely idiosyncratic and the costs of regulation fall
primarily upon those being regulated, state regulation is superior
because the state regulator can craft tailored rules with limited
negative externalities."7 This approach allows society to benefit
from policy experimentation among jurisdictions to find the opti-
mal solution to a problem.
1. Access to Local Rights-of-Way
Access to local rights-of-way is a quintessentially local issue and
should be administered by state or local authorities. The question
of when, how, and under what circumstances a company should be
permitted to lay cable or install a facility in a local community de-
pends almost completely upon local information regarding the
impact of the access on the surrounding environment. The FCC
has neither the resources nor the inclination to gather and process
the information necessary to determine whether Verizon should be
permitted to dig a hole on the corner of Main and Third Streets,
or if so what conditions should apply. By comparison, state and es-
pecially local officials can easily discover which businesses are
adjacent to the proposed project, how traffic patterns are likely to
lic goods that consumers determine are important enough to relocate. Public education is a
quintessential example; it is far from clear that a choice of cable companies, for example,
rises to this level.
175. Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 176 (quoting
McConnell, supra note 134, at 1495); see also Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making
Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency
in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1203 (1997).
176. Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 175.
177. See id.
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be affected, and which hours the company should be permitted to
dig in order to limit the impact of the disruption on the commu-
nity.
Moreover, when a local official approves, modifies, or rejects an
individual proposal, both the benefits and the costs are borne
largely by his or her constituency. A permit denial may impose
some infinitesimal cost on the national subscriber base due to a
temporary setback, and approval may generate some minuscule
benefit to the public at large. But this incremental amount pales in
comparison to the benefits that flow to the local community upon
completion of the installation, or the costs of local disruption
caused by the company's construction.
Of course, the Commission should prevent local officials from
using their control of rights-of-way as a lever to secure additional
regulatory control or unrelated concessions. The Telecommunica-
tions Act currently preserves state authority to "manage the public
rights-of-way," including the power to "require fair and reasonable
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competi-
tively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis.' 78 Congress should
tighten this language to assure that the costs, if any, of applying for
and receiving a permit to access the public rights-of-way do not ex-
ceed the actual cost of the action to the city and its residents.
Permit fees should not serve as a post-transition substitute for exist-
ing cable franchise fees. 79 And any non-pecuniary conditions that
the state regulator places upon access must be reasonably related
to the company's activities. Companies that feel they were unrea-
sonably denied a permit should be allowed to bring a proceeding
before the Commission to review the reasonableness of the local
government's action. This oversight will help assure that any re-
strictions upon rights-of-way access appropriately reflect legitimate
local concerns and are not simply a mechanism for states and
communities to engage in rent-seeking behavior.
2. Zoning, Undergrounding, and Other Network Restrictions
Similarly, state and local authorities should retain jurisdiction to
place reasonable restrictions upon the installation of network fa-
cilities in a given community. There are a variety of local concerns
178. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006).
179. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 345-46 (citing as an example CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 50030 (West 2009), which provides that permit fee to access rights-of-way "shall not
exceed the reasonable costs of providing the service for which the fee is charged and shall
not be levied for general revenue purposes").
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that could affect where or how a particular portion of the network
is installed in a local community. For example, a locality may wish
to require that a cell phone tower be placed in an area other than
that sought by the telecommunications company, or it may desire
that a landline be placed underground rather than on above-
ground poles. These restrictions may flow from safety or aesthetic
concerns, or simply to assure that the utility's actions fit the local-
ity's master plan for development. Local government should have
the authority to address these concerns as long as such restrictions
do not unduly burden telecommunications companies' ability to
deliver services to the community.
The Telecommunications Act's provisions regarding cell phone
tower siting offer an example of how this discretion may be regu-
lated. Section 332 preserves local authority over "decisions
regarding the placement, construction, and modification of per-
sonal wireless service facilities," but allows wireless companies to
challenge a locality's decision if the decision "unreasonably dis-
criminate[s] among providers of functionally equivalent services"
or "prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless services.', 8 0 Section 332 allows wireless companies
to file a complaint in district court, but Congress should instead
vest such jurisdiction in the FCC. Unlike the district court, the FCC
has the expertise and broad national perspective over telecommu-
nications policy that is necessary to determine whether a locality's
restrictions unreasonably burden the network.
E. State Enforcement, Federal Adjudication:
The Case of Consumer Protection
Consumer protection is the most difficult, and most controver-
sial, part of the regulatory puzzle to parse between the federal
government and the states. One can make a strong case for vesting
jurisdiction over these issues with the states. Many consumer pro-
tection issues arise because of the unique vulnerability of a
particular segment of the population whose circumstances would
escape the notice of a national regulatory body. For example, the
California Public Utilities Commission has recently developed
special procedures for landline and wireless telephone companies
to protect limited-English-proficiency customers. 1" When
180. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (2006).
181. See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Address the Needs of Telecommunications
Customers Who Have Limited English Proficiency, Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal. Rulemak-
ing 07-01-021 (January 17, 2007) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
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telecommunications carriers market their products in California in
languages other than English, the CPUC requires that they take
additional steps to protect the interests of customers targeted by
the campaign, such as providing in-language customer service dur-
ing business hours and annual in-language notification of the
resources that the CPUC makes available to combat telecommuni-
cations fraud.12 Because California has a disproportionately high
population of customers for whom English is a second language,
this issue is of particular importance to the CPUC, which has the
local knowledge necessary to identify the problem and craft a solu-
tion. But limited-English-proficiency customers are a much smaller
proportion of the national population, which means that the FCC
is unlikely to notice and address their concerns.
State regulation of consumer protection issues also reaps the
benefits of regulatory diversity and state experimentation. Unlike
interstate economic regulation, consumer protection typically falls
within the scope of the state's traditional police powers. One rea-
son why policymaking is usually vested at the state level is to
encourage interjurisdictional experimentation in a way that allows
society to explore multiple potential policy solutions. Federal regu-
lation of these issues imposes a single rule on all consumers, which
can stymie alternative approaches before their benefits can be
tested and evaluated. Because of the value of regulatory diversity
and the traditional vesting of social issues with the states, the DACA
working group has endorsed the continued preservation of state
jurisdiction over consumer protection issues: "[t]he decision to
leave the state agencies with the initial authority to address these
matters reflects the judgment that their proximity and accessibility
to the affected consumers make them the superior institution to
address such matters in the first instance."
8 3
On the other hand, regulatory diversity over consumer protec-
tion issues can give rise to substantial spillover effects and disrupt
national economies of scale. Unlike rights-of-way access and local
Reform), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/wordpdf/FNALDECISION/63728.pdf. In
the interests of full disclosure, the author has represented Verizon Wireless during portions
of this proceeding.
182. See Phase II Decision Addressing In-Language Market Trials, Fraud Notification
and Reporting, and Consumer Complaint and Language Preference Tracking for Limited
English Proficiency Telecommunications Consumers, Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal. Deci-
sion 08-10-016 (Oct. 6, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdf/F1NALDECISION/91818.pdf;
Order Instituting Rulemaking to Address the Needs of Telecommunications Customers
Who Have Limited English Proficiency, Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal. Rulemaking 07-01-021
(January 17, 2007) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform), available
at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdf/FINALDECISION/63728.pdf.
183. Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 343.
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network management, consumer protection rules often impose
costs on the national infrastructure. In California, for example,
carriers have complained that the in-language rules will require
significant changes to their customer service procedures. Because
call centers are often regional or national in scale, these regulatory
costs are borne by customers across the country, while the benefits
flow primarily to a discrete subpopulation in California. Similarly,
the annual notice requirement forces carriers to modify uniform
national billing and notification procedures to satisfy California's
rules. At a minimum, these costs include the steps necessary to
identify and segment limited-English-proficiency customers in Cali-
fornia and prepare and deliver a supplemental notice to them. If
this subpopulation cannot easily be identified, the carrier may
simply mail the notice to all California customers, or even all cus-
tomers nationwide, to guarantee compliance.
Standing alone, these costs may seem inconsequential in com-
parison to the additional protection they afford to a uniquely
situated segment of the population. But when the forty-nine other
states enact similar rules imposing costs on society to protect their
own parochial interests, the cumulative result can significantly dis-
rupt economies of scale. As Professor Hazlett notes, carriers facing
these challenges have three options.18 4 First, they can provide cus-
tomized services on a state-by-state basis, a solution which sacrifices
the economies of scale otherwise achieved by regional or national
networks. 185 Alternatively, they may be able to identify the state with
the strictest consumer protection requirements and tailor a na-
tional plan to meet that state's needs 8 6 This option imposes
unnecessary compliance costs on national subscriber networks to
satisfy the toughest state's concerns. Finally, they could adopt a hy-
brid model that adopts a national model for most markets but
"customized local service where state regulation is onerous.', 187 This
eliminates some of the economies of scale of an otherwise national
network, though not as much as complete customization would,
and leaves open the possibility of simply exiting those markets
where regulation has become too onerous. 8
State regulation of consumer protection also raises the possibil-
ity that states will use their authority to re-engage in backdoor rate
184. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 199.
185. Id.
186. Id. As Hazlett notes, this alternative only works if state rules do not actually con-
flict; it assumes that the strictest state's requirements encompass the less restrictive
alternatives imposed by other states. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 199-200.
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regulation, due to the "hydraulic pressure" of government to "ex-
ceed the outer limits of its power."' 89 Several commentators have
noticed this phenomenon in wireless services, where the Tele-
communications Act explicitly preempted state regulation of rates
and entry but retained state jurisdiction over "other terms and
conditions. '"' 90 Cooper and Koukoutchos highlight Minnesota's at-
tempt to enact a "Wireless Consumer Protection" statute that
would have, inter alia, required carriers to notify and receive af-
firmative consent from customers sixty days before a rate increase
went into effect.' 91 The Eighth Circuit found this to be an imper-
missible attempt to regulate wireless carrier rates by other means
and held the statute preempted by the Telecommunications Act. '92
The court noted the difficulty of navigating the line between per-
missible and impermissible state regulation:
Any measure that benefits consumers, including legislation
that restricts rate increases, can be said in some sense to serve
as a "consumer protection measure," but a benefit to con-
sumers, standing alone, is plainly not sufficient to place a state
regulation on the permissible side of the federal/state regula-
tory line.9
Because of the significant likelihood of negative externalities
and the difficulty of policing permissible versus impermissible state
regulations, Hazlett, Cooper and Koukoutchos all argue for broad
federal preemption of consumer protection issues.194 It is somewhat
artificial to distinguish between the negative externalities of paro-
chial economic regulation and those of parochial consumer
protection regulation; both foist costs on the network that threaten
to disrupt national economies of scale. But as noted above, this
complete preemptive approach would sacrifice the local knowl-
edge that state and local authorities possess about the
idiosyncrasies of their discrete markets. Preemption sacrifices local
needs to the greater good, and arguably forces local populations to
internalize costs imposed upon them by national uniformity.
The solution is to replicate, on a smaller scale, the jurisdictional
divide applied to the network as a whole in Sections C and D
189. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983).
190. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A) (2006).
191. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 355-56.
192. See Cellco P'ship v. Hatch, 431 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 2005).
193. Id. at 1082-83.
194. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 357-58; Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular
Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 223-24.
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above. Rather than conceive of consumer protection as a mono-
lithic policy segment that must reside at either the federal or the
state level, Congress should ask which aspects of consumer protec-
tion are best vested with the federal government, and which with
the states. It can then devise a jurisdictional arrangement that lev-
erages both the local knowledge of state regulators and the
national perspective of the FCC.
1. Consumer Complaints
As an initial matter, state public utilities commissions should re-
tain their traditional role as the locus for consumer complaints.
Most state commissions maintain a consumer affairs division which
receive and investigate complaints against telecommunications
companies. These complaint mechanisms provide telecommunica-
tions customers an alternative venue to pursue individual concerns
when the companies themselves are non-responsive. Typically the
commission will process a complaint, seek a response from the car-
rier, and work to resolve the customer's concerns.
Individual complaint investigation is akin to a local service and is
better handled at the state level. As noted above, state regulators
tend to be more accessible than their federal counterparts.
Institutionally, they also tend to be more attuned to local concerns:
because they regulate a smaller population base, each individual
voice carries more weight and therefore state regulators are
relatively more likely to address an individual complaint. Moreover,
many complaints relate to consumer protection issues, which as
noted above are allocated to the states as a default rule. In the
aggregate, significant numbers of similar complaints can serve as a
red flag indicating a potential consumer protection concern in
need of regulators' attention. Finally, locating this service at the
state level leverages the infrastructure that states already possess
rather than constructing a new federal apparatus to serve this
need. The DACA working group notes former California Public
Utility Commissioner Susan Kennedy's concern that "federal
regulators would never be equipped to accept millions of calls
from individual customers involved in billing disputes. '
195
195. Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 342 (quoting Susan Kennedy, Federal and State
Regulatory Responsibilities in a National Communications Market 1, 5 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform)).
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2. Consumer Protection Rulemaking
With regard to setting consumer protection standards, Congress
should vest primary jurisdiction with the FCC but permit-indeed,
encourage-states to bring proceedings before the Commission to
address consumer protection issues. When a state notices unusually
high numbers of consumer complaints regarding a particular
problem or otherwise becomes aware of a potential consumer pro-
tection issue within its community, the state should determine
whether, in its discretion, to petition the FCC to take action on an
issue. For generally applicable consumer protection issues such as
cramming 96 or slamming, the Commission could adopt a uni-
form national policy that would address the problem at a national
level. For more discrete issues that lack national implications, like
the California limited-English-proficiency rules noted above, the
Commission could decide to forebear from general regulatory au-
thority and instead permit the petitioning state to adopt state
regulations to address the practice, subject to Commission review
to assure that the negative externalities of the rule do not unrea-
sonably burden the national network. The Commission may also
elect to forebear from general regulatory authority over an issue
whose solution is not immediately apparent, and instead allow
states to experiment with different potential rules against a back-
drop of FCC oversight.
States are well-positioned to serve as the Commission's eyes and
ears in the local community with regard to consumer protection
concerns. One may posit instead a network of FCC field offices, but
states are better equipped to fulfill this role. On a practical level,
state public utilities commissions already exist; at least in the short
run, it is more efficient to leverage existing resources than to con-
struct a new infrastructure from scratch. And on a more theoretical
level, state public utilities commissions remain more attuned to
local needs than an FCC field office: the latter would still draw its
pay from Congress and is ultimately accountable to national regu-
lators rather than the local population. For this reason, state
regulators are closer to the community than an FCC satellite and
would be better positioned to act as the Commission's eyes and
ears in a community.
This hybrid regulatory approach, wherein states serve as prose-
cutors and the FCC as adjudicator of consumer protection policy,
196. "Cramming" refers to the unauthorized placement of a charge on a customer's
telephone bill.
197. "Slamming" refers to the practice of changing a customer's long distance service
without that customer's authorization.
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combines the best qualities of both levels of government and solves
many problems created by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in one or
the other. By bringing cases of local concern before the FCC, the
states allow the FCC to leverage their local knowledge and assure
that federal regulators address local issues that may not otherwise
demand the FCC's attention. At the same time, federal regulators
can address local consumer protection concerns from an appro-
priately national perspective, recognizing both the costs and
benefits of a proposed rule to society as a whole and minimizing
the risks of overregulation or underregulation that flow from state
decisionmaking. State-filed adjudication then becomes a feedback
mechanism by which the Commission can gauge the local effects of
its national regulations and adjust its approach where necessary,
without developing a duplicative and wasteful clearinghouse of its
own for processing retail consumer complaints nationwide. More-
over, the FCC can judiciously partake of state experimentation to
devise the optimal solution to a particular problem, while monitor-
ing various state schemes to guard against excessive negative
externalities that may otherwise occur in an unregulated federalist
environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying purpose of the Telecommunications Act is both
laudatory and timely. By eliminating outmoded regulations and
consciously destroying the existing monopoly structure over local
telephone service, the Act sought to unleash the power of competi-
tion on greater portions of the industry. Through this change,
policymakers could trust markets to lower prices, expand service to
more people, and encourage investment in new technology, with
deliberate oversight by regulators to protect against the eventuality
of market failures.
Unfortunately, although the Act sought to, in the president's
words, "bring the future to our doorstep,"'98 Congress kept one
foot firmly planted in the past by perpetuating silo-based regula-
tion of services and continuing to rest jurisdiction over local
telephone and cable networks in state hands. In essence, the Act
focused on intramodal competition by encouraging the construc-
tion of more monoline service networks to compete against
existing service providers. This framework not only turned a blind
eye to existing distortions generated by parochial regulation of
198. See Clinton, supra note 1, at 215.
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certain services, but failed to anticipate and adapt to technological
developments that have effectively eliminated the monoline service
model.
The next version of the Telecommunications Act must recognize
the reality of intermodal competition and approach the industry as
a single network that offers a variety of communications services
over competing network platforms. The regulatory model sketched
above recognizes that some elements of this network are national
and some are local in scope, and vests jurisdiction in a manner that
leverages the unique attributes of each institution. By uniting
economic regulation under the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's umbrella, Congress can prevent destructive parochial
regulation from disrupting the economies of scale that the industry
could otherwise achieve. And by leaving many non-economic issues
in the hands of the states, subject to federal oversight, it can pay
appropriate attention to the needs of local communities not large
enough to demand national attention. Through this structure,
Congress can avoid the fragmentation of markets that the Com-
merce Clause was designed to protect against, while allowing the
telecommunications industry to continue to reap the unique bene-
fits bestowed by Our Federalism.
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